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Abstract
This thesis explores the relationship between regime types and international
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Investigating 12 African regimes, varying
between the governing types of autocratic and democratic over the last 50 years, and
three specific humanitarian INGOs, I search to see if there is one regime type that works
the best with this type of INGO. Using INGO presence, amount of funding, and amount
of volunteers from each INGO in each country, I measure the presence of INGOs in
democracies and autocracies.
Compiling both an aggregate view of all 12 countries, and a disaggregate view of
4 individual countries, with investigative case studies, I discover that democracies are not
the regime type that works the best with these INGOs. Contrary to the assumption made
by most, that democracies do work best with humanitarian INGOs and should have the
greatest INGO presence, I find this not to be the case. Rather, by grouping these regimes
cohesively into four categories (autocracy, democracy, interruption, and transition), I find
that democracy has the least amount of INGO presence, and very low numbers regarding
the amount of funding and number of volunteers. Autocracies, interruption, and transition
countries have greater INGO presence.
In addition, as this question evolved over the course of writing it, other questions
had to be asked and other variables considered. Issues of access, demands and needs of a
country, and the domestic political environment all had to be enveloped into this
question.
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CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction: Factors contributing to INGO growth.
This thesis explores the relationship between regime types and international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. This is to discover if there is a specific regime
type that fosters the best relationship possible with these types of INGOs. The study of
regime type has a long history in which regime types have been scrutinized, judged,
categorized, and observed by various scientists. The study of regime type is important for
obvious reasons, such as: to attempt to understand the nature and decisions of the rulers
of a state; how regime type may affect domestic policy; how regime type affects the
population and different groups of people living under its rule and; how regime type
affects the international community and international policy.
Similarly, NGOs and INGOs are becoming increasingly important players in both
the domestic and international fields. With their increasing presence also comes
increasing influence and power, sometimes equal to the role of the state. What this means
is that NGOs and INGOs are coming into frequent contact with the state, and with
various regime types around the world. Not only is the number of NGOs and INGOs
increasing, but the services they offer are vast, varied, and expanding. These
organizations preform functions that stretch across the entire spectrum, from political to
developmental to social to humanitarian services. This means that these organizations are
encountering and working in similar fields as those of states. Therefore, states have to
deal with the presence, services, and abilities of these organizations in not just one, but
many areas. Depending on multiple factors, this can either cause contentious or
harmonious relations to arise.
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To expound further, INGOs have had a presence in the national and international
communities for over two hundred years, but a large proliferation of INGOs has occurred
in just the last two to three decades. In the early 1900s, there were fewer than 300
INGOs. That number has since grown; currently, there are more than 6500 INGOs (Karns
and Mingst, 2004). There is a diverse array of INGOs around the world, each performing
various activities and offering unique services. Additionally, as the world changes and
evolves, INGOs find themselves to be changing in nature as well, having to adapt to the
different demands and needs of the global community.
While INGOs have exploded onto the international scene and are proving to be
versatile, regime types have also diversified, changed, and evolved over the last few
centuries. Regime types can be ranged along a wide spectrum, from democracies to
autocracies. In this thesis, regime types are not equated exactly to the idea of “state” but
highlight the type of governmental regime in power. However, the terms regime and state
will be used interchangeably here. Regimes have been a constant fixture in world history,
harking back to the regime of the Holy Roman Empire, feudalism, and sovereign power.
In some manner, regimes have been in place for the governance of territory and people
(Spruyt, 1994). For example, regimes can be considered as democracies, semidemocracies, hybrids, dictatorships, military rules, authoritarian, etc. The difficulty often
lies in determining what type of regime one is dealing with, as each can include many
different elements and features (Diamond, 2002).
INGOs and regime types are both of great importance in the global arena. As the
world has grown increasingly interconnected and complex, INGOs and regime types are
experiencing closer and more frequent contact with each other. There appear to be three
2

key factors that have contributed to the proliferation and expansion of INGOs:
globalization; the end of the Cold War (with a focus on democracy, sustainability, and
development) and; complex humanitarian crises. These factors have created the need for
more INGOs to help countries that cannot help themselves.
The first factor concerns globalization and interdependence. With increasing
human connectivity, the state can no longer take part in or have total control over
everything that might occur within their borders. Coinciding with a decrease in control is
the revolution in communications, in which news and information can pass across the
globe almost instantaneously (Karns and Mingst, 2004). Flood, drought, civil war, piracy,
bombings, genocide, disease, and other disasters are no longer borne in isolation. What
may occur in a remote corner of the globe can be known worldwide in seconds and
NGOs can offer quick aid.
The second main factor offered to explain the growth of NGOs is with the end of
the Cold War, less attention has been given to security issues. Instead, there has been an
increase of focus on spreading democracy. Space was available for other issues to take
precedence (Karns et al., 2004). Consequently, once security became a less important
issue, organizations were sent to aid governments that were transitioning from
autocracies to democracies, to help with development and to increase stability. As NGOs
proved to be capable and successful in many situations, their funding increased and more
trust was placed in the abilities of NGOs. Therefore, instrumentally, these organizations
were a welcome addition to assisting and completing the goals on the international
community’s agenda (Heyse, 2006). The expansion of NGOs is also due to their growing
sophistication. In the early days of NGO creation, they were organizations that were
3

burdened by uncertainty, old and slow-moving technology, and staff who lacked
sufficient training. Now, however, NGOs benefit from advanced technology, global
positioning systems, rapid methods of deployment, and trained professionals. (Barnett,
2005)
The third main factor for NGO proliferation is what is known as “complex
humanitarian emergencies (CHE)”. Emergencies are no longer considered to be those
composed of a single factor. Rather, they encompass a “combustible mixture” of a variety
of factors. CHE’s are now thought to be conflicts that “ (...) involve a high degree of
breakdown and social dislocation (...) requiring a systemwide aid response from the
international community.” Some of the CHE’s that are included in this definition would
be: state failure, displacement of refugees, and populations at risk from hunger, disease,
and violence (Barnett, 2005).
In a similar vein, Shamima Ahmed uses the term complex political emergencies
(CPE). These have the following characteristics: civil conflicts (long and short term) that
revolve around ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities; disintegration of national
governments in which public services disappear and political control passes to provincial
governors and warlords; mass population movements (displaced persons trying to
escape); economic destruction in the form of hyperinflation, failing currency, and
collapse of markets (all scenarios which can be exacerbated by drought and food
insecurity) (Ahmed, 2006). This is also a plausible explanation why NGOs have
proliferated, as CHE’s and CPE’s require a multifaceted response with new kinds of
interventions and assistance tools offered by many groups.
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Another key factor, according to Julie Fisher (1998), is the political context,
which is critical for the success of NGOs. The political context includes type of regime,
political culture, the degree of state capacity to implement policy, and the degree of
political stability. Dependent upon these circumstances, the government can respond to
NGOs in a variety of ways. A government may fear NGOs because of the possible loss of
state power that could occur. NGOs are capable of changing the status quo because upon
entering into civil society, these organizations can mobilize large, often marginalized
groups of people, and highlight questionable activities and tactics of the government. The
people and the international community may begin to question the methods and validity
of the government which can ultimately threaten the control and power of the state. If
governments don’t fear NGOs, they can take advantage of them, manipulating their
resources and personnel for military or security purposes. On the other hand,
governments can also form a relationship with these organizations, either allowing them
freedom to work in civil society or using them to enhance legitimacy, both nationally and
internationally. Often times a state gains legitimacy if NGOs are allowed the latitude to
enter and work within a country, as this is seen as a progressive, liberal, and democratic
value. It is positively regarded by the international community for a country to allow
multiple organizations to work within their borders, toward further development and
progress or for major reforms (Fisher, 1998).
Therefore, NGO activity and presence has increased greatly over the years, as
well as the information on the numbers and types of NGOs. Data from the Yearbook of
International Organizations (2004), shows this dramatic increase in the number of
INGOs. At the turn of the century there were no established INGOs, though a few IGOs
5

existed. In the early 1900s the number of INGOs grew to 150 and current day boasts
around 6500 INGOs (Karns et al., 2004).
Figure 1: NGO Growth in the Last Century
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INGOS and REGIME TYPES
Of the research that has been done, much is slightly outdated and current research
appears somewhat lacking, with several gaps in the data. Most of the literature discussing
NGOs focuses on four topics. The literature tries to explain why NGOs exist, the
expansion of NGOs in recent decades, the relationship between NGO characteristics and
behavior, and the diversity within the NGO community (Heyse, 2006). There have also
been internal studies done regarding more functional aspects of the NGOs. Many have
6

investigated such factors as the decision-making process and organization of NGOs. For
example, much literature discusses the organizational, political, and administrative
structures of these organizations. In addition, the activities of specific NGOs have been
investigated, to understand the services they provide, as well as the norms and principals
which they follow. All of these are worthy investigations, but provide a more practical
and functional approach (Heyse, 2006).
Additionally, NGO and INGO influence is felt in many ways, at times bolstering
the role of the state, while at other times threatening the states power. Moreover, these
organizations are influencing policy and the domestic political environments and
situations of the place they are in. NGOs can provide support for the state and the
decisions and policies that are made. Those considered to be the elites of the community
often have a direct link to those in government, voicing opinion and concerns of the
different NGOs or INGOs that they might hold membership to and which carry weight in
civil society. On the other hand, political, developmental, and social NGOs and INGOs
can represent different groups of civil society, becoming embedded within civil society in
which their role is to challenge the state. These types of NGOs and INGOs are often
found at the grass roots level, raising awareness of contentious issues, providing a place
for people to gather, highlighting transgressions by the state, and challenging the state by
demanding or creating arenas for transparency and accountability. Whatever the
underlying motivation for an NGO or INGO may be or however their presence might be
interpreted or felt, these groups are gaining influence and power, with increasing
interaction with the position of the state.
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While NGOs tend to have an impact on the domestic level, they can also have an
affect at the international level. Some INGOs, such as Save the Children, Cooperative
Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Oxfam International, World Council of Churches,
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, can have a very large international
impact. If one or more of those organizations is operating in a specific country and
reporting the condition of the people and the behavior of the regime, not only is the
domestic situation affected but so too is the international community. If serious
transgressions are occurring and made public, suddenly what were small, private, and
domestic issues, have now caught the attention of the world. All of this is due to the work
and persistence of an INGO. Thus, the relationship between these two players cannot be
ignored or overlooked. Depending on the nature of their relationship, the effects could be
felt domestically and internationally, with positive or negative repercussions.
Therefore, are the relationships between regime types and NGOs or INGOs
mostly good? Moreover, are regimes influencing these organizations or is it the other
way around? Are all groups in civil society being represented? Have the elites of the
community taken over these organizations, under the guise that they are helping, but
really only motivated by their own ambitions and wants? Are those at the grass roots and
lower classes being adequately represented? Additionally, is it true that NGOs are
positive influences, furthering democratization around the world? Are NGOs and INGOs
always good or is this perspective biased due to a western liberal democratic ideology? Is
there a predominant bias as the western world uses these organizations to spread
democratic thinking and values?
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More importantly, the focus on humanitarian organizations is a crucial one. First,
there is not much that cohesively addresses the impact of humanitarian INGOs. However,
this is a mistake. These types of INGOs are too important and their work too vital to
overlook as they provide the services and aid that are most desperately needed during
times of conflict and strife. These INGOs offer assistance, food, water, medical attention,
shelter for refugees, and much more. They aid in times of natural and man made disaster
and address the issues, materially and politically, of those in need of help. These
organizations need to be looked at closely, to see if theirs is a good relationship with
certain regime types.
On the other hand, is there a different relationship present due to different
motivations? For example, do regimes work better and have better relationships with
NGOs that are only in their country to advance the economic infrastructure of the
country? If an NGO is focused on increasing the productivity and usable resources of a
country, will a regime have a better relationship with that NGO, more so than with an
NGO that is there to highlight any human rights abuses that may be occurring? Some
INGOs focus on development of different organizations or groups of people within civil
society or on issues of sustainability and economic growth. Other INGOs are known to be
politically motivated, designed specifically to promote and support the democratic
transition, consolidation, and growth in countries. Do these INGOs have a more
successful relationship, even if a regime doesn’t want or necessarily agree with the
political agenda of certain INGOs? Still others might be motivated to aid grassroots
organizations or push certain international political agendas. All of these organizations
have different goals and motivations in which they are geared to do specific work. If
9

regimes don’t work well with these types of organizations, or don’t allow for aid, why is
this the case? This question is important, especially when thinking of the two recent
situations in China and Burma where aid was denied or delayed during natural and man
made disasters. Are these two countries simply outliers or is rejection of outside
assistance more common than believed?
The relationship between humanitarian INGOs and regime types appears to be
one of great importance and yet, very little has been studied or written about this specific
dynamic. Most of the literature focuses on INGOs that are political or developmental in
nature and there appears to be many gaps and indecision in the literature today. In what
little has been written, a constant debate between various peoples and perspectives has
manifested. The people who are discussing regimes, INGOs, and their relationship, fall
into two groups. The first group encompasses those whose opinions oscillate. At one time
they say democracies might be better but at another time, autocracies are better. No firm
consensus can be reached. The other group is represented by those people that don’t
oscillate. Democracies will always be the regime type best able to foster a good
relationship. It now appears that the idea that democracies are the most likely regime type
to foster a good relationship with humanitarian INGOs has become the automatic
assumption.
MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION
The evolution of this research question stems from the desire to attempt to fill the
gap in the literature, while also seeking to find if there is one specific regime type that
works best with humanitarian INGOS. Should it be the assumption that democracies are
10

the (only) regime types that do foster the best relationship possible? As such, the research
question of this thesis is the following: Is there a specific regime type that is best able to
foster a good relationship with an international humanitarian organization (INGO)? Is this
regime type always a democracy? Essentially, is one type of regime more
accommodating or more willing to allow an INGO latitude to do its work? To discover if
there is a certain regime type, this thesis proposes an investigation, looking at several
variables, that measures the relationship between regimes and INGOs.
Specifically, this investigation will look at the international humanitarian
organizations Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres [MSF]), Peace Corps
(PC), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These organizations
being similar and different, will provide a compelling analysis. While the ICRC and MSF
focus mostly on medical aid, all 3 organizations provide humanitarian aid that is not
strictly medical. All conduct a variety of activities encompassed in the broad sphere of
humanitarianism. A study of the different INGOs will consider the following: internal
organization, capabilities, resources, activities, planning, development, deployment,
principals, norms, funding, services, and size of the organizations. Also, are there any
countries where INGOs are conspicuously absent? This is to gain the greatest
understanding of how, when, why, and where these organizations have the most success.
The specific regime types will be those in the region of (mostly) Sub-Saharan
Africa. This region will include the regimes in the following countries: Lesotho, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia,
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This investigation will look at
the features of the regime. For example, some of the following are important features to
11

consider: regime type found in each country; regime (electoral) organizational and
administrative structure; free elections; one party versus multiparty; transparency; leader
(leadership); etc.
Moreover, this thesis will encompass a brief historical analysis, investigating not
only the regime types and INGOS that have been present in the countries mentioned
above for the last fifty years, but the various circumstances of 4 of these countries, in
specific case studies. Observing this period allows for many factors to be considered. For
example, while there are different periods of internal conflict within a country, the
proliferation of INGOs, and specific types of INGOs, has mainly occurred in the last 20
to 30 years. Some INGOs are known as “briefcase” INGOs; they respond only to
immediate and urgent crises (Stoddard, 2006). Once those crises have been managed and
dealt with, many INGOs will then depart from the location, to leave the situation in the
hands of the government. This thesis needs to account for these INGOs as well as those
INGOs considered “chronic”. These types of INGOs are involved not only in cases of
emergencies, but they are also placed in countries to handle long term care, development,
planning, and sustainability. They look to not only deal with the urgent issues at hand, but
they attempt to figure out a way to reverse situations and create capable citizens. These
INGOs seek to formulate new ways of life and develop new opportunities.
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The history and evolution of NGOs, which includes humanitarian organizations,
has been rapid, complex, and rich in diversity and content. The relationships between
INGOs and regime types are exceptional to observe and study and additional questions
must be considered. Is it possible to see a historical trend of certain regime types that
12

have asked for help? Have there have been moments when regimes have blatantly refused
help when offered? These additional questions are important for several reasons. Any
discernible pattern may help uncover what type of regime is best for fostering a good
relationship. By discovering this, it could be anticipated where INGOs will have the most
success. Specific patterns could also be observed to indicate when a country is
deteriorating and preemptive measures could be taken to avoid worst-case scenarios. Not
only would early intervention be a possibility, but the international community and
INGOs would know which regimes would be able to work well and cooperatively with
those INGOs.
If there are certain observable patterns, one should also be able to see both the
presence and absence of different features and elements of the regime (e.g.: corruption).
This implies that successful features and elements could either be applied to other
regimes or replicated to be used by regimes that are struggling. If this could be done, the
worth, significance, value, and reason for attempting to answer this research question
could be great. This could change both the course and ability of regime types and INGOs
to better serve their citizens. This would allow the international community to step in
sooner, to alleviate suffering, to ease pain, and to help those who are unable to help
themselves.
If it is possible to discover that there is a certain regime type that is the most
conducive for fostering good relationships, it will pave a path of hope for the future. The
international community and INGOs would possess the knowledge that certain regime
types are less restrictive and INGOs will be able to have more influence. With this
knowledge, INGOs could enter a country being more prepared and ready for problems or
13

special circumstances that might arise. They will be more aware if they are entering into a
friendly environment or not. Capabilities and resources would be put to the best use and
possible early intervention could occur.
This research question is also important for another reason. It will allow us to see
if the common belief is true, if democracies do work better with INGOs. If this turns out
to be correct, why then would this be the case? What are the reasons, factors, or demands
that allow for democracies to work best with humanitarian INGOs? Is it about social need
or are there issues of access? Is it wrong to assume that democracies will work better with
these organizations because most people equate higher levels of democracy with higher
levels of civil society? If there is a higher level of civil society, is there less of a need for
INGOs? Are democracies better equipped to deal with natural and man made crises? Are
they better able to serve their people? Is it correct of us to assume that just because a
regime looks democratic and meets certain western, liberal, democratic markers, that the
regime is democratic and better able to care for its community? Is it simply the case that
regime type is the only factor affecting and influencing INGO presence and/or success
within their country? Are there other factors to consider?
What can be stated now is that it is incorrect to simply make this type of
assumption. Empirical investigation, when possible, is needed to either support or refute
this argument. At the most basic level, this is what this research question is trying to
address. The rest of the thesis is presented in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews
literature looking at several different subject areas including INGOs, African civil society,
and regime types. This is followed by my theoretical assessment and hypotheses. Chapter
3 discusses the research design and methodology while chapter 4 is descriptive in nature,
14

looking at the 3 INGOs chosen for this thesis. Chapter 5 is the analysis of the data and
how I measure this relationship, as well as specific case studies. Chapter 6 provides
alternative explanations for discussion, as well as a summary of what has been discussed,
my basic argument and findings, as well as the limitations of this study and possible
future avenues to pursue.
My initial findings suggest that this relationship is not as clear as previously
thought. There are many variables to consider, especially regarding the aspects of a
democratic political environment and the level of demand or need by a regime. According
to my data analysis and case studies, democracies have the least interaction with
humanitarian INGOs and thus, don’t necessarily have better relationships, but simply
have fewer relationships with these organizations. This would suggest, due to many
reasons, that democracies have less need, or demand less assistance or aid, for
humanitarian INGOs. This raises the question of what about democracies and the
democratic political environment makes this the case. This also raises the question of
how is the relationship between other regime types and humanitarian INGOs? What are
their specific needs and demands? What other factors need to be considered? While my
findings remain somewhat inconclusive, they do suggest that every time the regime type
and political context of a country need to be investigated to determine if a relationship is
present and what kind of relationship that may be.

15

CHAPTER TWO:
Literature Review and Theory
INGOs and NGOs
There is a large amount of literature that discusses regime types, NGOs, and
INGOs separately, but not a lot is discussed concerning the relationship between the two.
Specifically when assessing this relationship between regime type and humanitarian
INGOs, very little is said. Most literature focuses on political or developmental NGOs
and INGOs and their relationship with the state. Many agree that there is no clear answer,
while others would state that democracies simply work better.
Therefore, much of this literature review focuses on the many types and
motivations of NGOs, INGOs, and regime types, and the ambiguity created by such a
vast and varied community of organizations. Also mentioned are the issues unearthed
when labeling regime types (e.g.: if democracies are actual democracies) and the unique
situation of NGOs and INGOs, civil society, and regime types in Africa. While these
discussions do not pertain directly to the research question, it is necessary to discuss the
variations of these organizations and the difficulty labeling regime types. These are
factors that contribute to why there might be a possible gap in the literature. When
assessing the relationship, all these factors add several layers of complexity to the entire
situation, as nothing is clear, concise, or holding the majority opinion.
Owing to the gap in the literature, political and developmental NGOs and INGOs
and their relationship with regime types are reviewed here, as well as multinational
corporations (MNCs). This is in an attempt to broaden the field of this investigation, to
see if there are any visible patterns in the relationships between regime types and other
organizations, as little is said about humanitarian organizations. The goal is to offer the
16

most complete picture of the situation and how these factors could affect the work of
humanitarian INGOs and the relationship with different regime types.
INGO/NGO COMMUNITY
A possible reason for the gap in the literature may be because the focus in not on
the impact or relationship of INGOs with regime types, but because the focus is
elsewhere. This focus is on factors such as the different definitions, roles, categorizations,
types, and challenges for NGOs. The ongoing debates regarding these factors are both
helpful and harmful. They are helpful as they allow for a greater picture of the NGO
community. They are harmful because so many people are saying different things,
creating further confusion. This doesn’t allow for frequent agreement or consensus in the
NGO community, but simply more information to unravel and understand. For example,
definitions of NGOs all vary slightly. According to Heyse, NGOs are” not-for-profit,
private, self-governing organizations aiming at ‘improving the life of disadvantaged
people’”(Heyse, 2006). Karns believes NGOs to be “voluntary organizations formed and
organized by private individuals, operating at the local, national, or international
level” (Karns, 2004). Shamima Ahmed and David Potter adopt the UN definition that
states NGOs are “any international organization which is not established by
intergovernmental agreement” (Ahmed and Potter, 2006).
Part of the confusion also stems from the wide variety of different types of
organizations (both non-governmental and governmental organizations) with different
aims and goals, working nationally, regionally, and internationally. Below are examples
of some of the different NGOs in the NGO community. This list is simply meant to
highlight the vast variety of organizations, each with different motivation and focus:
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AGO: anti-governmental organizations
TRANGO: transnational NGOs
GONGO: government-organized NGOs
GRINGO: government-regulated and initiated NGOs
BINGO: business and industry NGOs
DONGO: donor-organized NGOs
ODANGO: ODA-financed NGOs
FLAMINGO: flashy-minded NGOs (representing rich countries)
PO: people’s organizations
ONGO: operational NGOs
ANGO: advocacy NGOs
SMO: transnational social movements
GSM: global social movements
(Karns, 19)
There are also many ways to categorize or conceptualize NGOs based on their
varying types and the diverse services they provide. Along with the traditional role which
includes disaster and famine relief, NGOs also now focus on economic and social
development. This can include the following: political roles of advocacy (lobbying);
agenda setting; public education; monitoring international agreements and; interacting
with intergovernmental organizations (Ahmed, 2006). Lester M. Salaman and Helmut K.
Anheier suggest twelve “major activity groups” that NGOs are engaged in: culture and
recreation; education and research; health; social services; environment; development and
housing; law, advocacy, and politics; philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism
promotion; international activities; religion; business and professional associations and
unions and; groups “not elsewhere classified” (Iriye, 2002). When specifically
considering humanitarian organizations, due to such variety, some of the literature
suggests labeling NGOs as hybrid organizations. No longer serving only one purpose,
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this type of organization is one that combines both human rights and development
(Nelson and Dorsey, 2008).
Other categorizations of NGOs are those that were seen during the early years of
NGO birth and development. During this time, NGOs were as “apolitical” as possible and
neutrality was a key principal (for some organizations, they claim it still is). “ (...)
apolitical is understood as those actions that are not intended to be the cause of
suffering” (Barnett and Snyder, 2008). The second variation would then be political, with
specific ambitions and goals (Barnett and Snyder, 2008). Therefore, one issue currently
debated is if certain humanitarian organizations are truly neutral or have other ambitions,
using political means to achieve certain goals.
Coinciding with this debate is another type of categorization which encompasses
two different strands. These two strands are known as “Dunantists” and “Wilsonians.”
The “Dunantists” are named after Henry Dunant, the founder of the ICRC and who some
consider to be the patriarch of modern humanitarianism. These humanitarian
organizations define “ (...) humanitarianism as the neutral, independent, and impartial
provision of relief to victims of conflict and believe that humanitarianism and politics
must be segregated” (Barnett, 2005). This type of organization stresses neutrality, seeking
to address the issues at hand without creating any further political conflict.
The “Wilsonians” follow the path laid by Woodrow Wilson. He believed that it
was “ (...) possible and desirable to transform political, economic, and cultural structures
so that they liberated individuals and produced peace and progress, (...) and attack the
root causes that leave populations at risk” (Barnett, 2005). This type of organization
attempts to counter the immediate crisis while also attacking the underlying problems.
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Essentially, these underlying problems could be politically based which means possible
conflict between INGOs and the host government. This becomes a gray area in which
boundaries are less well defined as to which activities are permissible (by both the INGO
and the regime) and which are not.
Other categories of NGOs have also been created regarding their relationship to
the state. For example, NGOs can be seen as structures that are either competing with,
paralleling, preexisting the state, or structures of the state itself (Aeberhard, 1996). This
proves to be a significant grouping. Depending on if an NGO is competing, paralleling,
preexisting, or a part of the state structure allows or disallows the NGO (and a
government) to do its work efficiently and successfully. While no one specific
categorization claims to be dominant, this is meant to illustrate the diverse categorization
methods that have been employed to provide some kind of ordering system for NGOs.
One intriguing and important facet of NGO development has to do with the role
of the state and the changing nature of the international system. Since 1648, the
international community has operated under the Westphalian State system. This was
decided upon by the international community after the Thirty Years War. Since that
moment in history, the international community has (for the most part) strictly adhered to
this overarching rule that internal sovereignty will be respected.
Nevertheless, there has been increasing complexity, confusion, and blurring as to
the role of the state and the idea of sovereignty. Due to this blurring of responsibility,
NGOs find themselves increasingly intervening and occupying more space domestically
and internationally. According to R.J. Vincent (1975), intervention is “Activity
undertaken (...) which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a
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discrete event (...) is it not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a
conventional pattern of international relations” (R.J. Vincent 1975, as cited by Bellamy
and Wheeler, 2001).
However, this intervention can prove to be contentious in two ways. First, unless
bound by treaty or convention (such as being a member signed to the Geneva
Conventions), states (regimes) have to either give consent for help or aid to enter into
their country, or they have to ask for help. Help and aid cannot be forced into a country.
Additionally, while aid cannot be forced into a country, tension between NGOs and
governments is still a possibility once NGOs have entered. This tension can arise because
as organizational entities, NGOs are still subject to the rules and laws of the country in
which they are operating. Therefore, in some countries, NGOs have a great amount of
freedom and latitude while in others they might be severely restricted. In others, such as
Myanmar, NGOs have a more limited role (Karns et al., 2004).
Second, humanitarian organizations assert that rights and values are intrinsic in all
humans, simply because of their humanity. Value for human beings is found independent
of the state. With this assertion, a set of claims are made that can counteract the claims
made by the state. This implies that the agenda a state pursues must recognize not only
national interests but the interests of its people. To some degree, this claim can constrict
the state and limit its sovereignty and freedom (Finnemore, 1999). Thus, it is a delicate
and changing relationship that has evolved over the years between NGOs and the state.
The relationship between NGOs and the state has also been influenced and
challenged by several other factors, as well as operational and ethical obstacles. Some of
these obstacles are due to the constant changing nature of the international system. For
21

example, globalization is driving the world to becoming increasingly connected, where
space, time, and distance are shrinking. People, objects, and commodities are in more
frequent and close contact to the other. News is known within seconds all around the
world and political, cultural, and economic variables are interlacing in a complex web
across the globe. These interlacing factors challenge the roles and boundaries of both
NGOs and the state, as both have to deal with increasing and complex challenges (Iriye,
2002).
Moreover, there has been an increase in new waves of complex emergencies.
These types of emergencies are multifaceted and tend to have a multitude of causes and
consequences. For example, a drought or famine in one country can cause different
parties to fight for food and water, which could lead to war, displacement of peoples, and
refugee overflow into other countries. There are new forms of global poverty as well, due
to a declining capacity of national governments to deal with these complex issues. Global
institutions have also come under attack and shown weakness, as there have been new
global pressures for accountability and efficiency(Lindenberg, 2001).
Obstacles are also found within the NGOs themselves. Factors such as the
resources and man power available, as well as the legitimacy, transparency, and
accountability of the NGOs all play a crucial role in the relationship between NGOs and
the state (Lindenberg, 2001). Therefore, the changing international world, NGOs as
organizations and self operated entities, and the relationship between NGOs and regime
type, have all witnessed multiple changes and challenges which continue to make this
field of study diverse and intriguing.
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Finally, there is another possible reason why the literature discussing NGOs
seems incomplete. Scholars use international relations theories to not only describe,
explain, and predict various aspects of international relations, but for theories of global
governance (Karns, 2004). The three major theoretical camps in international relations
are liberalism, realism, and radicalism (Marxism). With the end of the Cold War a serious
challenge was presented to international relations theorists, as the world paradigm
shifted. As such, the discipline has become fragmented, with no dominant theory. This
affects the study of NGOs because no one theory is used to study them, and many of the
international relations theories used today seem an ill fit. Scholars and theorists appear
unable to decide how to best investigate, measure, and judge NGOs in the international
sphere (Ahmed, 2006).
According to Ahmed (2006) two approaches, to the study and understanding of
NGOs, appear somewhat more compatible than others. One is liberalism, a theory that
emerged out of interdependence theory, to broaden the study of international politics
beyond the scope of the state. This theory posits that the international society and the
relationships between countries are compiled of many more actors than just the state.
Other actors, entities, persons, and organizations need to be considered. While this theory
doesn’t focus exclusively on NGOs, it argues that there needs to be space in international
relations theories for their growing importance. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobson
make the following comment:
The traditional view of the international system as hierarchical and focused almost
exclusively on states has evolved into one that is nonhierarchical. While sovereign
states continue as principal actors, and as the only ones that can levy taxes, and
conscript and raise armies, these functions have declined in importance relative to
newly important issues, such as environmental protection and sustainable
23

development. There are now many actors in addition to states: intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations, enterprises, other non-state
actors, and individuals... Nonstate actors are performing increasingly complex
tasks, especially in the newer issue areas (Ahmed 2006, as cited by Weiss and
Jacobson).
The second approach Ahmed believes could clarify what NGOs do in
international politics is constructivism. Essentially, this sociological and philosophical
approach emphasizes the importance of the interactions between individuals and
institutions and the affect these interactions have on interests. Constructivists believe that
interests, identities, and roles are socially defined. “ [the] analysis focuses attention on
ideas, norms, epistemic communities, global civil society, and regimes - areas of
international politics most conducive to the exercise of NGO influence” (Ahmed, 2006).
Therefore, constructivists believe that a state’s interests aren’t fixed but are malleable,
able to be shaped and formed. NGOs are able to do that and wield influence at the state
level. This has the potential to change the way the international sphere not only looks, but
operates.
Consequently, while Ahmed believes these two approaches might be best suited to
study and explain the NGO community, there still appears to be a lack of consensus about
which theory to use. This indecision not only leads to gaps in the literature, but increases
the complexity in this field of study. Therefore, it is entirely possible that this will remain
a convoluted field, until some sort of agreement is reached on how best to study
NGOs.
Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant also see large gaps in the literature. Due to
the multifaceted world of INGOs, the impact of those organizations has yet to be
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adequately addressed or investigated. Lindenberg and Bryant believe that much of what is
written about NGOs focuses on what they are doing, but little investigates the process of
NGOs and how that affects the product, or final result (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001).
Paul Nelson and Ellen Dorsey also agree. Much has been done to study the functions and
methods of NGOs, but little on their affect (Nelson, 2008). Akira Iriye also feels that the
world’s focus has been elsewhere and this is perhaps why the literature regarding NGOs
is not as extensive as it could be, despite the growing number, impact, and influence of
NGOs. One reason is that the preoccupation of historians, scientists, and politicians has,
until recently, been focused on state-centered activities, strictly those of a political,
military, diplomatic, and economic nature. As Iriye states:
Writers have focused on such themes as diplomacy, the rise and fall of great
powers, the causes of wars, and the origins of the First (or the Second) World
War ... so long as one continues to be fascinated by these topics, and of course
they remain legitimate objects of scholarly inquiry - it will be easy to neglect
international organizations, dismissing them as irrelevant to the diplomatic and
military dramas being played out by the states (Iriye, 2002).
AFRICA: NGOs and CIVIL SOCIETY
While the previous section discussed the many facets of the NGO community, this
section offers a general overview of NGOs and Africa. The relationship between
international humanitarian organizations and regime type appears not to be a primary area
of concern. While specifically investigating Africa, the most common theme found was
the role of NGOs in civil society and their influence on democratization. Again, no firm
consensus has been reached but rather, there are continued competing perspectives. One
side argues that NGOs have and do help democratization in African countries. This side
states that these countries, due to colonization and internal warfare and strife, have not
25

been able to further democracy on their own. Instead, additional outside help was and still
is necessary for this process. The other side would state the NGOs have been harmful in
the democratization process, infusing African countries with western, liberal ideals and
goals, pushing the agenda of the West. This side suggests that the people of Africa have
had little say in how political development has progressed in their countries. Therefore,
this deserves mention here as international humanitarian organizations work within the
sphere of civil society and have multiple interactions with the democratization process.
Philippe Schmitter surmises the following about NGOs and civil society:
[NGOs] are intermediary organizations and arrangements that lie between the
primary units of society - individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups of various
kinds, village units - and the ruling collective institutions and agencies of the
society. They occupy a special place. They are integral, in short, to civil society.
NGOs differ in principles, membership, and goals ... they seek to benefit society
without necessary direct benefit to themselves (Welch, 1995).
Most agree that NGOs enjoyed a rapid expansion in Africa during the mid 1980s.
By the mid 1990s, NGOs had expanded unpredictably in Africa. Common belief is that
this expansion was due to two reasons. First, African governments were unable to handle
the basic demands of the government process. Many NGOs were established out of
desperation as governments were unable to provide or maintain basic services. This
became especially evident during the 1970s. Worsening terms of trade increased already
poor economic situations while also creating increased dependence upon international
financial institutions. Africa needed the help of the voluntary sector as governments
proved incapable (Pinkney, 2009).
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Second, the expansion of Western ideology was important. NGOs grew strong in
the West, as more attention and time was given to the development of the voluntary
sector, as the state’s interests were focused on security and other issues in the global
arena. NGOs were able to portray virtues enhanced by Western ideology, goals, values,
and ideals. NGOs became important vehicles, as the state needed others to push the
West’s global agenda and to pursue political and developmental goals. The Washington
consensus helped to solidify these ideas as the consensus believed the voluntary sector
was “administratively and morally superior to the state sector.” This consensus
encouraged aiding third world countries that needed economic and developmental
assistance. This appeared starkly evident in Africa, as countries were in economic decline
and governments were unable to contend with multiple difficulties and increased
demands by the African people. Western NGOs were able to fill the void and offer
assistance, with more mobility and flexibility than Western states had at that time
(Pinkney, 2009).
In this arena too, the relationship between NGOs and regimes remains unclear.
Stephen Ndegwa finds that while intentions may be good, NGOs operating in the civil
societies of African countries don’t always further democratization. He sees NGOs as
two-faced, those actively opposing the state and furthering democracy and those
accommodating the repressive state. At the same time, Ndegwa, quoting Larry Diamond
states, “ ... civil society has become the cutting edge of the effort to build a viable
democratic order” (Ndegwa, 1996). Additionally, the most outspoken advocates of
democratization and opponents of authoritarianism in African countries have been
voluntary and associational groups.
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E. Gyimah-Boadi also finds the influence and impact of NGOs in civil society to
be ambiguous. He believes, like Ndegwa, that there are two sides to consider. Opposition
parties have become eager to support antiauthoritarian and democracy promoting regimes
and use them for their benefit. However, the government also plays a role by attempting
to co-opt and control those groups. Gyimah-Boadi finds that the autonomy,
independence, and integrity of civil society organizations are typically threatened in one
way or another and thus, not always able to implement democratic reform (GyimahBoadi, 2004).
Philippe Schmitter also finds civil society and NGOs having a precarious and
often tenuous position in the democratization process. According to Schmitter, civil
society can contribute to democratization in multiple ways. Civil society can stabilize
expectations and social bargaining which means civil society can, by simply having a
voice, make demands and highlight issues that need to be addressed and/or changed. Just
by having a civil space in which to freely operate, civil society is able to generate a more
civic normative environment which can then bring actors closer to the political process.
Civil society also reduces the burdens of governance by taking on some of those
responsibilities, while at the same time check potential abuses of power and act as a
watchdog of the government.
However, Schmitter also notes that civil society can impede consolidation in
other ways. Civil society can make political majorities more difficult to form, simply by
trying to represent all the varied groups within civil society. With so many groups
demanding changes and wishing to voice their opinion, this can exacerbate ethnic
divisions and create pork-barrel politics, which can then entrench certain socioeconomic
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biases. This can cause an unfair distribution of resources and certain influences to carry
more weight than others (Schmitter, 1997). In addition, civil society needs a strong
relationship with the state for consolidation of democracy. If institutions are unable to
work with and accommodate NGOs working for democracy, or don’t allow for public
space in which to facilitate the democratic process, civil society can remain weak
(Diamond, 1996).
Claude Welch relates this directly to human rights and humanitarianism in Africa.
Welch also finds tension between African governments and NGOs, as NGOs attempt to
protect their autonomy and the state attempts to control them. When considering human
rights, when NGOs monitor and report on governments’ human rights abuses, this is even
more true. Welch notes that contemporary Africa is very different from other regions:
Because of the limits of civil society and to the power of the governments ...
because of the shallow penetration of society by weak state institutions, there is a
relatively larger realm of unoccupied political space in Africa than anywhere else
in the world. This presents challenges and opportunities to NGOs. The quality of
leadership, strategies selected, and the resources and organizational maneuvering
room available limit what they can accomplish (Welch, 1995).
Welch and the others seem to find the influence and impact of NGOs in the consolidation
of democracy to be middling, due to the dual nature of NGOs, weak civil societies, and
state institutions.
In opposition, Robert Pinkney believes that for most part, NGOs are doing good
work in Africa and the “missionary spirit” to improve the lives of African people
continues. While African governments still continue to question the right of foreigners to
interfere in their affairs, and Western governments continue to question the wisdom of
funding countries that may support neocolonial or authoritarian policies, NGOs do
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provide valuable services. They promote development, provide relief and aid, and take
some of the burden off both African and Western governments. NGOs can’t be regarded
as substitutes for political parties but can push public authorities towards addressing the
needs and injustices that may be occurring (Pinkney, 2009).
REGIME TYPES
The literature investigating regime types is vast and the classification of regime
types has been undertaken by many. Nevertheless, these various classifications make it
difficult to state if a regime type is, for example, purely autocratic or purely democratic.
Perhaps there are no pure democratic or autocratic regimes. However, this ambiguity
might lead to being unable decisively state if humanitarian INGOs work best with
democracies, if it is not possible to label a regime as being completely democratic? This
is especially important to remember when discussing the countries within Africa that
have been labeled as democratic. Many of these countries are very young democracies
and despite being labeled as democratic, they still might maintain autocratic tendencies.
According to Larry Diamond, regimes are neither one type or another, but should
be considered along a spectrum. There is such variety in regime types that it is no longer
accurate to simply apply a label of democratic or non democratic. For example, the
following are some labels that have been used when describing regime types: democratic,
autocratic, authoritarian, despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist,
traditional, monarchic, oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic. These can then
be broken down into further subtypes (Schmitter and Karl, 1996). Therefore, there are a
plethora of different regime types in the world, many of which that seem to always be
making slight adjustments and changes.
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In Africa, this is no exception as there are many different types of regimes. To
offer the greatest understanding, it is necessary to be aware of the transition that Africa
has undergone with democratization and the changing regime types. Samuel Huntington
discusses three different waves of democratization, with the world currently in the third
wave. African countries are part of the third wave and Huntington gives the following
five reasons contributing to the occurrence and timing of this third wave: “the deepening
legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values are
widely accepted; the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s; a striking shift
in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic church, which manifested as being opposed
to authoritarianism; changes in the policies of external actors and; “snowballing” or the
demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing
models for subsequent efforts at democratization” (Huntington, 1996).
Despite the changes and consolidation of democracy for many countries, some
countries have struggled, even experiencing a reversal away from democracy. A majority
of those countries that have struggled with democracy and appear to have reverted to
other forms of governance are found in Africa. Huntington believes this is due to a lack
of political will and continued bad political leadership (Huntington, 1996).
E. Gyimah-Boadi agrees with Huntington that some African countries did initially
show signs of progress, but that many have experienced a backslide. He gives a more
detailed analysis of the political transition that African countries have recently
experienced. He states that Africa has experienced a “second liberation”, with an end of
formal single party rule and military dictatorships in many African countries. This has
been complemented by the emergence of multiparty politics and competitive elections
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(e.g.: South Africa in 1994). There has been a renewed interest in constitutionalism, a
surge in civil society, emerging parliamentary systems, formal processes to semidemocratic governments, political reforms, advocacy for human rights, and a decrease in
corruption (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
While there have been advances, there are several reasons why some countries
have fallen away from democratic tendencies, and into other regime types. First,
democratization missed some of the large and important African countries (e.g.: Sudan
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in some countries where democratization
did occur, it appears to have since stagnated. Africa’s new legislature remains deficient,
autocrats have not relinquished control over the constitution making process,
antidemocratic laws have been retained, and overall standards of democratic performance
are low. Incumbent regimes and a machismo culture still exist, both factors that continue
to perpetuate authoritarian values and traits. When there is the occasional show of
democracy, it tends to be without any real democratic tendencies. Elections are often
rigged and political involvement by the public remains low. Weak party development and
an unstable infrastructure contribute to democracy still being a transitional process for
many (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). What this implies is that African regimes vary by degree
and in manner, all experiencing different levels of governance. This is important as one
considers the relationship between regime type and international humanitarian
organizations.
When considering regime type, one cannot overlook the explanation offered by
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink. These authors believe in a more constructivist approach, which
states that democracies might work better with INGOs due to the influence of actors and
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institutions, domestic and international variables, and the implementation of norms. The
international community and the principles articulated in the Declaration of Human
Rights could be changing the general perceptions of countries regarding human rights
norms by persuasion and raising moral consciousness. There could be a linked process
between international mobilization around international human rights norms and those
norms found at the domestic level. Essentially, they look to see if countries are being
socialized to treat their people better. This is due, in part, to NGOs and INGOs
highlighting the gap between rhetoric and reality of the government. If this gap is found
to be present in any manner, these organizations, if allowed the space to do so, could
demand change. (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999)
These authors believe that the literature is underspecified as to the causal
mechanisms by which human rights norms spread. Nothing decisive has been stated
about these possible causal mechanisms. Rather, the literature is very general and vague
concerning how human rights norms may spread. They concur that the diffusion of
international norms in human rights areas depends on domestic and transnational actors
who connect with international regimes, alerting Western public opinion and
governments. These norms have special status because they prescribe rules for
appropriate behavior in the international community and help to define identities of
liberal states. At the most fundamental level, good human rights performance is a crucial
sign to identify a state as democratic and liberal. Therefore, if a country has been more
amenable and open to the socialization and influence of the international community and
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the norms it sets forth, there might be an increase in INGO and NGO presence in that
country.
The authors focus on three key areas during the socialization of countries:
instrumental adaptation, moral discourse, and institutionalization and habitualization.
Reasons why democracies or those recently transitioned to democracies might be more
agreeable to INGO presence is first due to instrumental or strategic motivation. Regimes
could simply want to change their human rights norms and how they treat their populace
because they are in need of resources or materials. They could also want to gain more
favor with the international community, or be better liked. Typically, the first signs of
change can be found for these reasons. Although these might not be the best underlying
reasons for initial change, the key point is that change is occurring. This starts the process
of domestic structural change and democratization. The transformation of identity has
begun and these can later be more fully and permanently integrated into society.
Second, a moral dialogue about the norms they are promoting begins between the
international community, INGOs, and the specific regime. This dialogue can include
many factors, such as persuasion, shaming, and moral consciousness-raising. This
dialogue, along with instrumental and strategic motivation, eventually can lead to greater
institutionalization and habitualization of norms. This implies that a norm not only
expresses a belief but creates the impetus for consistent behavior, where norms are
simply ingrained in society and considered normal. They become taken for granted and
depersonalized, an act done out of habit. (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999)
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Checkel supports this viewpoint with additional stress on domestic structures and
the institutionalization of a country. While the international community carries much
influence, how a specific regime responds and adapts is largely dependent upon what is
occurring within that country. What are the structures and institutions already set in
place? What is the dialogue occurring between actors? How adaptable and flexible are the
institutions and actors to change? Depending on these factors, the ability for a regime to
change and/or create new policy is different for each, determined by domestic and
political contexts (Checkel, 1997).
The interpretation is that most of these changes, with INGOs highlighting reality,
is more often allowed in those countries most willing to emulate and take on values
driven by the international community. These are countries that are democratic or wishing
to emulate democratic norms (which include human rights). Therefore, another argument
is that democratic countries tend to be more amenable and open to the ideas that are
posited by the international community and at the domestic level, more willing to allow
for such organizations that address social needs.
Political and Developmental NGOs/INGOs and Democracy
Finally, the following authors investigate different aspects of NGOs, INGOs, and
multinational corporations (MNCs) in context with different regime types. They offer
valuable arguments regarding political and developmental NGOs and INGOs in different
situations, dealing with different regime types. As little is said about humanitarian
INGOs, I want to discover if there is an agreement among these scholars, as to the regime
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type that works the best with these organizations. Perhaps some conclusions could be
drawn from then when assessing humanitarian organizations.
Emilie Jelinke looks at political and developmental NGOs working in
Afghanistan. Jelinke assesses the success the NGOs have had, as well as their
relationship with the previous and current regimes, and finds the situation to be tenuous.
A difficult working environment, has produced both positive and negative results with the
work done by the NGOs. Most challenging to fostering a good relationship is that the
roles and boundaries are blurred between non-government and government actors.
Jelinek has found that the government is misinformed as to the ability of NGOs,
heightened by a general distrust of foreigners. Complicating these issues is a frustrated
populace and NGO community, feeling as though the government is not doing enough.
Overall, there needs to be much more communication and trust between all actors
involved. As this is not the case, currently NGOs find themselves very limited, facing
governmental obstacles, as they feel their position and authority is being challenged. In a
country that has little experience working with NGOs and INGOs, there continues to be
struggles (Jelinek, 2006).
David Fisher suggests that perhaps the quality of a relationship between NGOs
and INGOs is more due to functional barriers that might be put in place by the regime
type. Some of these barriers include the following. First, the capability and willingness of
domestic authorities to work with these organizations. Domestic authorities might feel as
though their position and control of the situation is being threatened by outside aid and
could prove unwilling to work with INGOs, as they don’t wish to lose their power.
Second, often there is a lack of regulated rules, rules that are simply regarded as the set
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standard and everyone follows. Lack of regulated rules and adhering to one set of rules is
especially an issue when discussing international humanitarian law during disaster
scenarios and the willingness of regimes to follow IHL guidelines. The IHL guidelines,
set by the ICRC, are the rules typically followed by the majority of the international
community, but not every country follows these rules and as different situations arise, so
do different responses to those crises. This means that there is not a committed adherence
to the IHL guidelines and countries often do what they see is best regarding crises.
Third, questions of legal personality and fear of expulsion may arise, as well as
functional problems such as entry into the country, renewing visas, and the importation of
goods and aid. (Fisher, 2007) For example, as seen in Burma and China, the military
junta and autocratic regime types, respectively, blocked or delayed aid for multiple
reasons. When aid was allowed in, there were several issues of distribution and efficiency
in helping the citizens of those countries. Due to the various barriers put in place by these
two countries, many people suffered unnecessarily.
Bratton and Van de Walle believe that the transition in Africa, away from one
party rule and military regimes and towards democratization, could explain why
democracies might work better with NGOs and INGOs. They surmise how the transition
took place can account for the relations between INGOs and democracies. Coupled with
this is recognizing the importance of domestic political factors and outside influences on
regime transitions. There were several phases of regime transitions. These transitions
included crises of political legitimacy which led to public protest and confrontation, until
enough pressure was given to change the situation. However, the key moment for Bratton
and Van De Walle was when the public protested. In this moment, many diverse groups
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of people banded together, to fight the current military or autocratic rule. When the
protests didn’t dissipate or decrease, political liberalization by the government began. In
that moment when different groups of people joined in protest, including NGOs, a space
opened and there was a compatibility found between these groups, civil society, and
NGOs. This space allowed for protest and voices to be recognized and heard (Bratton and
Van de Walle, 1997)
Eve Sandberg also believes that there is a gap in the literature but confirms NGOs
and INGOs as being influential during the democratization process. In addition, she
believes that NGOs can and do affect state legitimacy. Therefore, those regimes not
concerned about their legitimacy will not feel as threatened and will allow for the
presence of these organizations. Thus, democracies would appear to be the better fit
(Sandberg, 1994).
Jeffery Leonardi investigates if MNCs warp politics and/or affect policy in
developing countries. He determines there are many variables which contribute to a MNC
having a positive or negative affect. He cites such factors as industry type, past and

While searching for patterns between autocracies and democracies, other organizations
different from NGOs or INGOs were investigated. This was an attempt to see if anything
had been written about the relationship between MNCs, regime types, and democracy and
if this could then be applied to NGOs. However, even when investigating MCNs on this
broader scale, there was nothing substantial that could be determined. Most of what is
currently being discussed regarding MNCs is the constant debate about whether
democracies or autocracies are better for foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. The
consensus is that democracies are better for FDI. Jensen cites that democracies tend to be
more “market friendly” and enhance stability of economic policy. In addition,
democracies are better known for their system of checks and balances, creating
incentives, ability to replace leaders, veto players, and the ability to prove to have
credible commitments to secure investments (Jensen, 2003).
i
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present relationships between country and company, resources and economic conditions,
bargaining and conflict, impact of modernization, and political manipulation. However,
he also acknowledges that nothing decisive can be stated. There are too many variables to
consider, all of which could have an affect on the relationship between a MNC and
regime (Leonard, 1980). Still, others look at the physical proximity and interdependency
of states and how those have an affect on the relationship between MNCs and regime
type, but with little consensus (Gleditsch, 2002). Despite this additional foray
investigating MCNs, it doesn’t appear that this relationship can be useful, as no patterns
were found that could be applied to the relationship between humanitarian INGOs and
regimes.
Therefore, the literature review includes many areas of focus and all are important
for grasping the largest understanding possible. The true affect of NGOs and INGOs and
their relationship with various regimes remains unclear, due to layers of complexity
found among these organizations, as well as the difficulty when labeling regime types.
The unique history and situation of African countries also contributes to this confusion, as
well as the void in the literature regarding humanitarian INGOs. Even when discussing
political or developmental NGOs and INGOs, and MCNs, there is much indecision, or
the belief is that democracies work best with these organizations, both tenuous
arguments. The next section delves into different possibilities as to why the assumption
that democracies work best with humanitarian INGOs is made. Different factors and
demands are considered as to why there might be more or less INGO presence in
democratic or autocratic countries.
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Theory
To reiterate, the purpose of this research investigation is to see if it can be
decisively stated if there is one specific regime type that fosters the best relationship with
a humanitarian INGO. I believe, as mentioned previously, that humanitarian INGOs are
hugely important and appear to be somewhat overlooked when considering their impact.
These organizations provide foundational services to aid those in need.
Contributing to this interest is the dilemma, as can be seen from the literature
review, that very little has been written about humanitarian INGOs and their relationships
with specific regime types. They are, of course, discussed in other ways, but little is said
from this perspective. Rather, the bulk of the material investigated concerns the
relationship between political or developmental NGOs and INGOs. When the gap in the
literature is addressed, it seems to be filled with either confusion and indecision, or the
forgone conclusion that democracies work better. Hence, I wish to see if I can fill that gap
and if this is true. Do democracies work better with these organizations and why might
this be the case? What is it about democratic political environments and the services
offered by these organizations that allow for a good relationship? What are the demand
factors that lead to having INGO presence in a country? Is this question an issue of access
or need? Moreover, does civil society play a greater role than anticipated? Do higher
levels of civil society indicate that there is less need for these types of organizations?
Does this imply there is less need for NGOs and INGOs in democracies, due to a
supposed higher level of civil society, and consequently, these organizations are simply
less active there?
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The services offered by these organizations are vast and different and address
various areas of need. Therefore, it should first be discussed why democracies, or the
democratic political environment, appear as the most obvious choice, as there are several
factors that could contribute to this assumption. One must also consider the odd balance
between two competing factors. What contributes to a democratic political environment
that easily allows access by these INGOs, and supposedly contributes to a greater level of
civil society than autocracies? In the same sense, could this create a situation in which
there is greater access but really less social need for their assistance? What are the
conditions that stipulate access versus need or demand?
There are many factors contributing to a democratic political environment which
could suggest why they might work best with humanitarian INGOs. Some factors could
include the level of access allowed by a regime or the level of civil society in which
greater levels of civil society might have less need for INGO presence. First, the general
characteristics attributed to democracies are typically such things as tolerance,
moderation, willingness to compromise, respect for opposing viewpoints, and greater
voice allowed for citizens (Diamond, 1996). These are the traits that are valued in most
democratic environments. These are the values that are to be emulated, the values that a
country which is transitioning to a democracy wish to emulate. These characteristics are
what people look for and expect to be present within countries labeled as democracies.
Similar expectations are those set by the Freedom House political and civil liberties
standards, which are the following:

41

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process,
including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections,
compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable
to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief,
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy
without interference from the state (Freedom House, 2010).
Therefore, these characteristics are supposedly built upon a certain type of
infrastructure within these countries. There are institutions and a civil society that focus
on allowing for their peoples needs to be heard and met. Moreover, humanitarian needs
can be addressed, either by the regime or INGOs. Citizens are able to voice concerns,
which could include receiving assistance from INGOs. Civil societies of democracies
allow for INGOs to do their work successfully and the working environment is easier due
to greater trust and willingness of officials and citizens.
Democracies typically are not, as autocracies might be, worried about losing control or
sharing power. Democracies are the accepted regime type of the international community,
and what, at least according to western liberal bias, countries should strive to be. Whether
this bias is accepted or not depends on individual countries and the international
community as a whole. By becoming more democratic, there is a sense of security and
reassurance that the country and regime should not feel threatened by other organizations
entering their domain (Jelinik, 2006).
With democratic institutions and thought as the foundation, there are usually
greater checks and balances put in place. This implies that there is typically less
corruption with the government and officials are held accountable. Funds and access are
allowed and distributed properly and there is no one person or one party to slow down the
42

process or even deny aid. Moreover, due to feeling secure and not feeling threatened by
other organizations, as a member of the international community, the democratic state
tends to allow for influence by international factors. As such, international society has to
an extent created certain norms about humanitarianism and human rights. The common
belief is that democracies are more willing to adhere to these norms than other regime
types. Finally, and a more functional component, is that with democracies there are
typically less issues regarding bureaucratic delays, customs barriers, visas, taxation of
aid, questions of legal personality, entry, importation of goods, and medical qualification,
all issues that could slow or deny humanitarian aid. (Fisher 2007)
These are all legitimate and common factors used to explain why democracies
might be the regime type that is best able to foster a successful relationship with a
humanitarian INGO. The western liberal democratic world does have certain expectations
and standards to be met to be considered democratic. If these conditions are met,
essentially it is assumed that democracies would be more willing to work with
humanitarian INGOs and that the relationship would be good. There are institutions,
checks and balances, transparency, accountability, responsibility, and general concern for
the citizens of that state. It makes perfect sense why democracies are thought to be best
suited to work with these organizations and why there would be less issues of access into
a country and less INGO presence required.
There are also some other factors to consider, along with specific regime type, as
to why INGOs are present and working well in a country. These factors consider the need
for these types of INGOs. Depending on the type and capabilities of a regime, there could
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be more or less need for assistance. These are also additional demand factors which could
necessitate or demand INGO presence. In a general sense, depending on the situation
within a country, there are several factors that could facilitate and/or increase the demand
for INGOs.
First, what has been (or is) the need or demand for INGOs to enter a country?
What are (if any) the development and economic problems specific to one country?
Depending on the levels of development and economic success of a country, if these are
low or not progressing, there will be greater need for INGO interference. Industrialization
(types of industry), modernization (degree and level of), institutionalization (political and
social institutions), and resources of a state are important variables in both the
development and economic spheres of a country. The state may be unable to provide the
resources and infrastructure in which to have successful development of their country and
additional help is necessary. Similarly, if there are economic problems and/or growth,
they might demand more intervention and assistance from INGOs.
Second, the history of the relationship a country has had with INGOs is important
as well. How a state has dealt with INGOs in the past might suggest if a future demand
will be made, or if needs will be voiced. Do democracies have a better historical record
when working with INGOs, simply because they have had a democratic past? Other
factors in these relationships that need to be considered are factors such as foreign policy,
domestic politics, the ability and willingness to work with outside groups, and the ability
to make credible commitments. A country’s foreign policy and how it deals with outside
groups is important as their foreign policy either allows intervention or it doesn’t. INGOs
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must interact with politics at the domestic level, and the relationship can hinge upon the
willingness of local officials to work with outsiders. All of these factors could either
increase or decrease the demand for humanitarian INGOs.
Third, and most important for this discussion, the humanitarian issues (the
humanitarian need) of countries need to be considered. If a country has a long history of
turmoil and strife, along with the factors mentioned previously, they could have a higher
need and/or demand for INGOs. Therefore, regime type might not be the first indicator of
a good relationship, but the context, including the amount of suffering found within a
country, will be the more deciding factor. Although some countries are democracies (or
recently transitioned to), there could be a need for humanitarian INGOs to be present in
these regimes, as well as others. In general, when speaking of African countries, they are
relatively young. Due to the decolonization occurring within this century, multiple
transitions and general chaos for many countries has caused a general inability of the
state to control domestic situations.
For example, some countries have experienced many of the following problems:
adverse humanitarian conflicts such as civil war, genocide, natural disaster, human rights
abuses, and political, religious, and ethnic cleavages. Many have experienced situations
in which the current government, democratic or autocratic, cannot by itself, aid its
people. Moreover, there tends to be much spillover (e.g.: refugee flows, displacement,
etc) into other countries. While one country could be experiencing relative stability, they
may unable to fully enjoy this stability due to the situation of their neighbor(s). Also
important to these countries is their political context. What has their history of regime and
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political transition looked like, including such factors as political realignment, domestic
structure, and the duration of regime? As mentioned in the literature review, this
transition has been anything but easy for many countries.
If countries were autocratic for a long time, then went through a few years of
transition, and have now been democratic for a number of years, this would suggest that
perhaps they had an easier political transition. For the reasons mentioned above, this
could imply an easier and better relationship with humanitarian INGOs. Coinciding with
this is if a country has had a positive or negative history of working well with INGOs,
during periods of disruption or transition. This would be in contrast to those countries
that have oscillated between various types of regimes multiple times, experiencing coups,
uprisings, and chaos for many years. For many countries, this means that there has been
very little in the way of smooth political transitions. A rough political transition could
indicate a worse relationship, as regimes struggle for power and control.
Finally, the demand and need for INGOs depends on the number and frequency of
humanitarian crises, both man made and natural. In Africa, humanitarian crises, as well
diseases that run rampant, are abundant here. Much of this is blamed upon the fact that
the history of the continent has been so troubled. In addition, and complicating the
situation, is a lack of any real medical infrastructure, assistance programs and plans,
resources, and personnel to deal with famine, disease, overpopulation, and drought.
Therefore, the need could be exceptionally high on this continent for humanitarian
assistance. As such, are the needs of the people in democratic countries being better
addressed, because democracies are better suited to dealing with crises, urged to help
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their citizens? Or does this mean that democracies are better able to assist their own
people and there is less demand for INGO presence? Should greater INGO presence be
seen in autocracies as they prove unwilling or incapable of assisting their people? Or will
INGO presence be less, due to issues of access?
Another angle to consider, which pertains to the idea of social need, is that which
investigates the level of civil society. With all the factors that contribute to a democratic
political environment, as mentioned above, the assumption seeming to be made by most
is that there is also a higher level of civil society in democracies. As a country becomes
more democratic, the space and freedom for civil society should increase, subsequently
decreasing the need for assistance. With a higher level of civil society, the general
assumption appears to be that civil society is taking care of social needs and there is no
reason for an increased amount of INGOs. Domestic groups and organizations are in
place to address situations or crises that may arise. Civil space allows for the mobilization
of people, progress, change, and for all to be heard. Therefore, there should be an
increased amount of INGOs in autocracies, as it is generally assumed that civil society is
silenced, or its power is mitigated in the effort to address social needs.
However, this assumption is precarious. This assumption suggests that civil
society might be a binary phenomena, where either a country has a thriving civil society
and there is no room or need for any other organizations, or a country doesn’t and then
something needs to fill the void. Civil society though, should not be seen as binary.
Rather, civil society can be thought of as an openness to other actors, including NGOs
and INGOs, and is more a way of life than a static phenomena. Should it be assumed that
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with a higher level of democracy, there is a corresponding higher level of civil society
and then less need for humanitarian aid and INGO presence? This would then create less
demand and less INGO presence in democracies and more demand in autocracies.
Nevertheless, an additional problem is that autocracies are typically seen as the
opposite of democracies. Autocracies are thought to be closed off, denying access,
wanting to control their population by whatever means necessary, afraid of outside
intervention and loss of that control, and lacking transparency, accountability, and
responsibility. Also, they are thought to have less freedom and space for civil society.
Those countries with the greatest need for assistance and aid could be the ones denying
access and thus, INGO presence and activity.
In addition, remembering the argument posited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, a
regime’s receptivity to INGO presence may not only be due to levels of civil society, but
to the influence of the international community. If a country has been more amenable and
open to the socialization and influence of the international community and the norms it
sets forth, there might be an increase in INGO and NGO presence in that country. This
suggests that a certain regime type may be more willing to be influenced by international
norms and over time, those norms become ingrained as habit. If this is the case, regimes
following the international norms may be more open and willing to INGO presence,
organizations often focused on spreading democracy and human rights.
Another argument to consider is that of Mercer (2002), who looks at the political
dimensions of NGOs and why the automatic assumption is to believe NGOs are better
associated with democracy. NGOs are typically viewed as autonomous actors, set to
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pluralize and strengthen the institutional arena. They bring a watchdog role to civil
society while working with grassroots organizations as they deepen and widen
possibilities for citizen participation. Moreover, these organizations are thought to check
state power and challenge its autonomy. INGOs and regimes are thought to have a
mutually enhancing relationship and generally positive and progressive.
Mercer feels this belief is predominant because the ideological biases and
normative assumptions that are reproduced in anglophone writings are based off a liberal
democratic view. Mercer claims that context is much more important than previously
realized and it is problematic that the default belief is NGOs do better and are more
closely associated with democracies.
Therefore, Mercer is one of the lone voices and proponents that suggests while still
ambiguous as to which regime type might work best with INGOs, democracies might not
be the best suited. Mercer’s argument stems from a different perspective, but one that is
worth mentioning here. Mercer looks at the political affect of INGOs on democracies and
democratization and their influence on civil society. She offers similar reasons as to those
mentioned previously, as to why democracies are the common assumption. Her argument
is valuable because she looks at the impact of INGOs, and their relationship with
regimes.
Her main contention is that this assumption is created because most ideas
associated with the success of INGOs derive from western historical experience and an
ideological basis that the literature founds in a liberal democratic bias. This bias leads to
these ideas that become universal and unequivocal. Many assume that democracies and
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the democratic political environment are the best in which to work with INGOs. Mercer
claims, however, that there has been a failure to theorize correctly about the (political)
impact of INGOs. Due to this bias, more attention needs to be paid to the context of what
is occurring in a country, with the specific regime and the various INGOs. Too much
weight is given to ideological persuasion and assumption. The assumption needs to be
less value and more context driven when under analysis.
Along with her main contention, Mercer also mentions a few other factors as to
why we shouldn’t make this assumption. First, there tends to be a generalization of
INGOs, despite the depth and variety found in the INGO community. This generalization
leads to clustering and regionalizing the success of INGOs, even though this might not be
the case. Simply because there has been success with INGOs in a few countries, this does
not mean that is true for an entire region or continent. Often times this means there is an
inattention to geography as well. The most frequently heard success stories are those that
are clustered around democracies. Much, however, depends on the context, including:
historical development of a country, the legacies of the colonial period, and the process of
class formation and urbanization. There are many domestic factors and variables that
must be considered to gain an accurate picture. Success of INGOs and NGOs can’t
simply be seen as a spillover into one country from another. That is too large of a
generalization to make. We can’t homogenize INGOs or the work they do, but need to
pay more attention to the context, the local dynamics, and the history of the country and
regime.
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Second, regimes can be “streamlining civil services”. This streamlining is more
often found with regime types that are not democratic in nature and exhibit greater
concern over loss of power and control. What this means is that due to a variety of
factors, INGOs could be thwarted in their goals, as well as run up against obstacles
depending on regime type. For various reasons, they could not be representing or
addressing the needs and wants of civil society. This means they could be restricted, in
several ways, depending on the latitude given to them by the regime type they are
working with. Regimes may allow for their presence, to show the international
community of their support for these INGOs, while in reality, they are extremely
uncooperative or create hardships along the way. Specifically, INGOs and NGOs could
be used in such a way to represent the civil society space they are in. For example, these
organizations, depending upon how long they have been in one country, in an
authoritarian regime, could be fragmented, competitive, authoritarian in nature, with a
more personalized rule. The question is then raised if these organizations are actually
representing civil society, and most importantly, the marginalized groups? These
organizations could be manipulated by the state or their services could be used in such a
way to benefit the power and role of the state.
On the other hand, could it be possible, suggests Mercer, that INGOs could eat
away at regime power and status, spreading their influence upwards and not vice versa,
which is the usual expectation. Does regime type affect the success and ability of INGOs
or do INGOs affect regime type? Depending on who is working within these
organizations, elites, lower class, or grass roots, regimes can attempt to create
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relationships with those people in a manner that benefits the state, and not the voices of
the people or civil society. Simultaneously, the people working in these INGOs could
have their own agenda, to gain power or access and this could change the motivation of
the INGO. Therefore, as the previous authors mention as well, institutions and actors, as
well as a multitude of other variables, must be taken into account.
For these reasons, Mercer believes we should not automatically assume
democracies work better with INGOs but acknowledge that this argument could be
premature. Instead, there needs to be careful consideration of where this bias is coming
from and what are the specific individual contexts that need to be evaluated. The
arguments that Mercer makes contribute to the validity of this question. Not only does
she question the assumption that democracies work better, but Mercer also essentially
switches variables. The traditional model would suggest that regime type is the
independent variable which is affecting the INGO, the dependent variable. Mercer
changes the entire situation by suggesting the possibility that the regime type is the
dependent variable, being affected by the INGO, the independent variable. Therefore,
there are many variables to this question and a plethora of possibilities. No matter what
might be found at the end of this investigation, even if the general expectation is correct,
that democracies do work better and there is less INGO presence, everything may not be
as it appears. This implies that while some might not find it a surprise, if it is the case that
democracies work better with INGOs, it shouldn’t be accepted as being that simple. The
argument could be premature or not considering all the angles which means there could
be different ways to interpret the results.
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HYPOTHESES
As for the hypothesis of this paper, while controlling for various factors, such as
need, demand, country situation, etc, I expect that greater levels of democracy will be
associated with greater levels of civil society and greater INGO presence. I expect to see
a positive relationship between these variables. However, after the literature review and
the other possibilities that have added layers of complexity to this question, one other
hypothesis can be tested. Hypothesis two states that there will be a negative relationship
between variables and that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO
presence. However, this could either be due to the regime type being the independent
variable and affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be the dependent
variable, being affected by INGO presence.
CHAPTER THREE:
Research Design and Methodology
The research design of this thesis is to use information and data from 3 specific
international humanitarian organizations and 12 Sub-Saharan Africa countries and their
regime types. That data will be analyzed, controlling for specific factors, while searching
for a possible regime type with the best relationship with an INGO. In this analysis, there
are many factors to consider: the dependent and independent variables; a historical
analysis investigating five specific variables and; two hypotheses. A range of sources
including books, journals, articles, and databases were consulted for this analysis.
Th 3 humanitarian INGOs, the PC, MSF, and the ICRC were chosen for specific
reasons. There are thousands of INGOs and others could have been used for this analysis
but for many reasons, these seemed the best fit for this research question. All three offer
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services in the humanitarian sphere, and despite having similar motivations, are each
broad in scope, providing these services in different ways. To illustrate this point, the
following table gives some examples of the types of treatments offered by each INGO,
within each of the 12 countries. As can be seen, all three organizations focus on aid and
relief, but with slight variations.
Table 1: Types of treatments offered by each INGO
Country

Treatment type:
Peace Corps

Treatment type:
ICRC

Treatment type:
MSF

DRC

N/A

material and medical
assistance; implement
IHL; strengthen
emergency response
capacity

outpatient, maternity,
surgical care; treatment
of HIV and TB

Kenya

small business
development;
information
technology; education;
public health;
prevention of HIV/
AIDS; sustainable
income generating
opportunities

implement IHL;
restoring family links
for refugees; visiting
detainees; helping
displaced/injured
persons.

specialized health care
(people suffering from
chronic and neglected
diseases)

education; community
economic development;
community health

domestic coverage of
various regions;
implement IHL; restore
family links for victims
of conflict; support
RCS

Lesotho

Red Cross: disaster
preparedness; health/
social services; water/
sanitation; supply
chain; human capital
and organizational
development

Red Cross: health; first
aid; disaster response
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HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment; develop
models of clinics

Country

Treatment type:
Peace Corps

Treatment type:
ICRC

Treatment type:
MSF

Madagascar

promoting English;
health education; child
survival activities;
natural resource
management;
community
development

domestic coverage of
various regions;
implement IHL; restore
family links for victims
of conflict; support
RCS

generates attention for
this country; helping
children; fighting
malnutrition

Malawi

HIV/AIDS prevention;
environment
preservation/
sustainability;
education

domestic coverage of
various regions;
implement IHL; restore
family links for victims
of conflict; support
RCS

prevention of HIV/
AIDS; implementation
of national plan for
HIV/AIDS prevention

Red Cross: health;
nutrition; water;
sanitation; disaster
preparedness
Mozambique

reconstruction and
expansion of education;
health education

domestic coverage of
various regions;
implement IHL; restore
family links for victims
of conflict; support
RCS

HIV/AIDS and TB
prevention; transferring
responsibility to local
units

Red Cross: community
engagement and
preparedness
Niger

meeting basic needs;
agriculture;
environment;
community
development; youth
education; health; food
security; sustainable
development; promote
HIV/AIDS awareness

Visiting detainees;
facilitates the release of
people on humanitarian
grounds; treatment of
injured soldiers;
emergency supplies;
implement IHL; repair
sanitation facilities in
prisons

fighting malnutrition;
mobile nutrition
centers, vaccinations

Rwanda

HIV/AIDS prevention;
malnutrition; malaria
prevention;
vaccinations; income
generation

visiting detainees (in
prison and in
communal lock ups);
relinking
unaccompanied
children; implement
IHL into legislation and
national curricula

assist displaced people;
war surgery; support for
victims; improve access
to health care;
responding to
epidemics; fighting
HIV/AIDS
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Country
South Africa

Treatment type:
Peace Corps

Treatment type:
ICRC

Treatment type:
MSF

education; promotion of
mutual understanding
between cultural and
ethnic groups; HIV/
AIDS prevention

domestic coverage of
various regions;
implement IHL; restore
family links for victims
of conflict; support
RCS

HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment; response
to emergencies; cholera
and TB treatment

Red Cross: health and
disaster management;
empowering
communities; tracing
services; implement
IHL; health awareness
Sudan

N/A

addresses needs of
vulnerable people in
rural areas; protection;
relief aid; medical care/
assistance; tracing;
helping in Darfur

creation of mobile
clinics; treatment of
cholera and
malnutrition

Red Cross: health and
water improvement and
awareness; emergency
and relief;
development;
dissemination of IHL
and peace culture
Tanzania

health education; basic
village needs for
conservation/
development of natural
resources; addressing
poverty

restoring family links;
implement IHL;
helping displaced/
injured people; visiting
detainees

treatment of HIV/
AIDS; working with
refugees; food supply

Zambia

health, agriculture,
environment,
education, HIV/AIDS
awareness

assist and protect
citizens displaced by
violence; visiting
detainees; helping
separated civilians;
implement IHL; health
care projects

HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment;
increasing access to
health centers

(Peace Corps, ICRC, MSF, 2010).
Functionally, with the exception of the absence of the PC in the Sudan and the
DRC, all three have operated or do currently operate in the 12 African countries chosen.
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By using 3 organizations and not just one, it allows one to see if there have been different
issues or problems with regime types and several INGOs. For example, in the history of
the ICRC being in these countries, there might not have been any issues to arise, with a
specific regime type for the last fifty years. This would suggest that the ICRC has had no
problems working with any regime type. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate more
than one organizations, to observe multiple relationships between INGOs and regimes.
The 12 countries chosen were because all 3 of these INGOs have had or do have a
presence in those countries. While a random generator was not used, I chose countries
that had the 3 INGOs present, while also looking for countries with different regime
types. Since the goal is to discover if one regime type works best with a humanitarian
INGO, multiple regime types (countries) need to be observed. This also explains why I
chose to use the data from the Polity IV database and scoring system.
POLITY IV SCALE
After reviewing various databases and indices, the analysis provided by Polity IV
proved to be the most applicable to this investigation. Other databases do not offer such a
comprehensive review of regime types, nor such a large scale that measures autocracy to
democracy. Polity IV has, over time, become one of the most widely used resources for
“monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.” (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2009). For this analysis, Polity IV is used to observe the timing of regime
changes and the different types of regimes.
According to Polity IV researchers,
The unit of analysis is the “polity.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary
defines a “polity” as a “political or governmental organization; a society or
institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” Eckstein and Gurr
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(1975, 26) provide a “simple, general definition of all ‘polities’ (or
‘governments’) as subsets of the class of ‘authority patterns.’” They further point
out that “all authority patterns are ‘equivalents’ of state-organizations.” (25)
Authority patterns are defined as “a set of asymmetric relations among
hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the
unit.... The direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the
regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and coordination of
roles within it (22) (Marshall et al., 2009).
In creating an empirical analysis, Polity IV offers constructed annual measures for
“both institutionalized democracy and autocracy, as many polities exhibit mixed qualities
of both of these distinct authority patterns” (Marshall et al., 2009). Democratic and
autocratic measurements are defined by the following specific variables. Institutionalized
democracy is born out of three interdependent and vital elements: 1) “the presence of
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences
about alternative policies and leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on
the exercise of power by the executive; 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in
their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other markers (such as rule of law,
etc) of a democracy are thought to be intrinsic already in these specific three
variables” (Marshall et all, 2009).
The indicator for measuring democracy is on a 0-10 point scale. Points are awarded
and given different weights according to the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief
executive. It should be noted however that according to the researchers at Polity IV, there
“is no “necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic. Rather,
democracy is treated as a variable” as some features which mark a regime as democratic
can be misleading, and don’t guarantee democratic tendencies (Marshall et al., 2009).
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Regarding the other measurement, Polity IV uses the term autocracy instead of
authoritarian when speaking of regime type. Polity IV believes that authoritarian is a term
used as a “catch all” for various types of regimes with a generally negative connotation.
Their definition of autocracy includes the following elements: 1) “a distinctive set of
political characteristics which sharply restrict or suppress competitive political
participation; 2) chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection but have
little institutional constraints once in office; 3) a high degree of directiveness over social
and economic activity (although, this last variable is open for interpretation as
democracies also have a high degree of directiveness” (Marshall et al., 2009).
The indicator for measuring autocracy is on an eleven point scale and the points and
weights given for this measurement are the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief
executive. Additionally, it should be recognized that the two scales, of democracy and
autocracy, do not share any categories. However, many of these polities can have mixed
authority traits, and thus can have middling scores on both the scales.
The two measurements of democracy and autocracy are then used to create a
combined polity score. The polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score
from the democracy score, resulting in a polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The factors mentioned here illustrate the reasons
why these INGOs and countries were chosen, as well as why the Polity IV data set is
being used to determine regime type. Consequently, the next step is to explain how this
relationship, and the core of this research question, is to be tested.
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VARIABLES
The dependent variable to be tested is the hospitality, or receptivity, shown by the
regime type towards the international humanitarian organization, to determine if there is a
specific regime type that is the most accommodating, allowing the most latitude to an
INGO. The dependent variable will then be tested in many ways, specifically, measured
by the following variables: 1) the length of time the humanitarian INGOs have been
present in each specific country; 2) the number of INGO volunteers in each country and;
3) the amount of funding given/allotted to each country.
The first variable considers the length of time an INGO has been present in a
country. This simply shows how long there has been an INGO presence in a country. This
is important because depending on how long an INGO has been in a country, we can see
if there have been any significant increases or decreases in the other variables (volunteers
and funding), including any contentious issues. This also enables us to see if there has
been a lack of INGO presence with certain regime types, if an INGO left for a certain
number of years, and why this might be the case.
The second variable looks at the number of volunteers that have been and are
working in each country. Understanding that each INGO used in this analysis is different
regarding their own resources, funding, and personnel, one can still question if there is a
significant decrease or increase in numbers during certain periods. Are there more
volunteers in a democracy or in a country that is transitioning? Are there less volunteers
in an autocracy and for what reasons? Is there a higher number of man made crises, in
which certain regimes don’t want help but would rather control their issues internally and
in isolation? Do natural crises require more assistance in countries that don’t have an
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infrastructure to handle such problems? Therefore, volunteer numbers may tell an
interesting story. The same can be said about funding. By looking at funding, we can
observe if there are significant differences in the amount of funding a democracy or an
autocracy receives.
Borrowing from the polity IV scale, the independent (explanatory) variable is how
democratic a regime may be. While many other variables need to be controlled for (e.g.:
need for INGOs, warfare, natural disasters, etc), by looking at the level of democracy of a
regime, I can isolate the independent variable while controlling for these other factors.
Therefore, does a specific regime type impact the time INGOs have been present, the
number of volunteers within that country, the amount of funding received, or raise issues
of access? I believe that by using these specific variables to test how receptive a regime
is to INGO presence, it will be possible to see if there is one regime type that fosters the
best relationship.
When looking at the different regime types of these countries for the past fifty
years in conjunction with the three variables mentioned above, no visible patterns were
easily seen. For example, when looking at the regime changes of the DRC, there has been
so much variation that it was difficult to ascertain if volunteer numbers and funding
changed significantly with different regime types. When looking at countries that had
fewer transitions but experienced long years of being an autocracy before transitioning to
a democracy, no patterns were evident here either. Overall, it was simply impossible to
see any significant changes with the volunteer numbers, funding, and access issues when
looking at so many regime changes for such a long period of time.
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Therefore, the next set of graphs show a different representation and illustrate
how I will test this relationship. To achieve greater consistency and seeking a cohesive
manner in which to measure the relationship, I have grouped the countries into the
following four categories: autocracy; democracy; transition; and interruption. By
consolidating the countries into this type of categorization, it will allow for a more
cohesive picture, as I was unable to decipher any patterns or significant findings when
dealing with so many regime fluctuations. The countries labeled in the autocracy category
are those that have been always labeled as autocracies. According to the Polity IV scale,
they have never been labeled as anything but autocratic. Using this scale, these countries
are Tanzania and Rwanda. These are the only two countries in this group of 12 that have
always been known as autocratic. While these countries have changed position on the
Polity IV scale, moving upwards and downwards on the scale, movement has always
occurred on the autocratic side. They have never crossed over to become a positive
number, to receive a democratic label on the -10 to +10 scale. Similarly, countries that
fall under the democracy category are those countries that have never been labeled
anything but democratic. For this case study, South Africa is the only country within this
set of 12 that has always been considered democratic.
Transition countries are those that had an autocratic rule for many decades,
experienced a few years of transition, and are now democratic. These countries typically
did not experience much fluctuation. However, they could have been autocratic for over
30 years, had a year or two of transition, and have now been democratic for over 20
years. These countries include Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, and Madagascar.
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Finally, the countries in the interruption category are those that have experienced massive
transitions, interruptions, anarchy, both autocratic and democratic rules multiple times,
and still find themselves to be tenuously balanced. These countries have known little
stability regarding regime type and include the countries of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Sudan, Lesotho, and Niger.
Therefore, the following graphs show the countries within their respective
categorizations. The graphs represent the polity2 score, showing the -10 to +10 scale.
Figure 2: Polity 2 Score for Democratic Countries
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Figure 3: Polity 2 Score for Autocratic Countries
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Figure 4: Polity 2 Score for Transition Countries
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Zambia

Figure 5: Polity 2 Score for Interruption Countries
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Again, these graphs are meant to show the various changes and fluctuations of
regime types over fifty years, illustrating the complexity when attempting to discover if
there is one regime type that fosters the best relationship possible with an INGO. It is to
be hoped that this categorization strategy makes it easier to observe if there have been,
and are, any patterns that could answer this question. In chapter 5, this information and
categorization is used in two ways. First, I look at the aggregate data for all of the
countries, using this categorization method. Second, I choose one country from each
categorization to present an individual, disaggregated account. Simultaneously, I will
present these countries as 4 specific case studies, to look more closely at the INGO
presence within that country, volunteer numbers, funding amounts, as well as the
democratic political environment and other possible factors that could affect this
relationship.
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There are also many other variables that will need to be accounted for, with some
overlap with the three main variables being used to test this relationship, within each
country. These include the following:
1) Natural versus Self-Created (Man-made) Disasters
The presence or absence of man-made and/or natural disasters. Is there a difference in aid
received or willingness by the government to work with INGOs when it is a man made or
natural disaster?
2) Timing of Historical Conflict
This considers the conflict (if present) in a country and the time/duration of the conflict
(e.g.: civil war, genocide, internal/external displacement of refugees and citizens).
3) Regime Rigidity
This is very similar to the variable regarding timing of historical conflict. This variable
looks at the amount of time the regime has been in power and the instability of the
current regime. Has there been consistent stability or has there been chaos, coup attempts,
general challenges to the rule, etc?
4) Prosperity and Wealth of the Country
Is the country prosperous and able to provide for itself? Does the country possess natural
resources? Is it able to access and benefit from those natural resources?
5) Ability of Regime
If they refuse help, would there be severe repercussions from the international
community? (e.g.: would a loan from the IMF be denied; would economic sanctions be
employed; would military action and force be taken, etc).
As stated previously, I hypothesize that greater levels of democracy will be
associated with greater levels of INGO presence. I expect to see a positive relationship
between these variables. This means that I expect South Africa to have had the best
relationship with INGOs. I expect the longest INGO presence in that country, as well as
the greatest number of volunteers and funding, and little to no issues of access. However,
hypothesis two states that there could be a negative relationship between variables and
that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO presence. Again, this could
66

either be due to the level of democracy of a regime being the independent variable and
affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be the dependent variable, being
affected by INGO presence. This would suggest that the opposite will be the case in
South Africa. Nonetheless, it will be important to know and understand why this is or is
not the case. Is there a better relationship, according to the variables being tested, with
democracies, solely due to regime type, or are there other factors and demands to
consider?
CHAPTER FOUR:
Case descriptions of INGOs
Specific Organizations
This section discusses the following for the 3 humanitarian INGOs used for this
investigation: internal organization, capabilities, resources, activities, planning,
development, deployment, principals, norms, funding, services, and size of the
organization. When the relationship is measured later, it is done with the knowledge of
the similarities and differences of each organization.
This chapter is more descriptive in nature because it is an important part of this
research question. In order to gain the fullest understanding, by using the three variables
(length of time, volunteer numbers, funding amount) to test the relationship between
different regime types and humanitarian INGOs, one must also understand what is
happening within these INGOs and the individual countries. As the theoretical section
suggests, there is more complexity that underlies this relationship. One has to account for
the demand and need factors or issues of access. To understand these, some of the
following questions have to be asked: What are the motivations of these organizations?
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Do they retain stances of neutrality or become embroiled in conflicts? What are their
capabilities and resources? What services do they provide? Are they better able to help in
certain disaster scenarios? What is their history with specific countries?
As mentioned previously, these specific organizations were chosen because of the
services they all offer, as well as being similarly motivated, but with slight differences.
Most operate in all of these countries, as well as having had a long term presence. This
allows us to see if there have been significant issues or problems between INGOs and
regime types for an extensive period of time. The 12 African countries were chosen more
at random, largely due to the fact that all 3 INGOs have or do operate in most of them. I
also wanted to investigate as many different regime types, (as well as their histories and
country situations), to find if one regime type stood out among the rest.
PEACE CORPS
The PC is a unique organization to include in this analysis as it operates
internationally (as do the others), but was created and is based out of the United States. It
is a strictly voluntary organization in its nature. The countries in which the PC operates
have to allow the presence of the PC (Iversen, 1963). While the PC is considered to be
the creation of John F. Kennedy, the slow emergence of the concept for the PC can be
found much earlier and could claim many parents. Throughout the 1900s, ideas were
formulated, some of which were implemented, for peace armies, civilian conservation
corps, and international voluntary service. However, the key moment came in 1960 when
two bills were passed that became the foundation of the PC. Representative Henry Reuss
and Senator Hubert Humphrey asked that the government consider the forming and
establishment of the PC (The National Archives: Teaching with Documents, 2009).
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While these bills did not pass, they did attract the attention of a young John F.
Kennedy, shortly before he would be sworn in as President. He first launched the idea
when he discovered he was a nominee. His famous speech at Ann Arbor, at the University
of Michigan, would be the first of many. He called upon Americans, especially those at
the university level, to step away from their comfortable surroundings and strike out
boldly for new worlds, to help new people. Two months after Kennedy took office, he
signed Resolution 10924 that officially created the PC (Ashabranner, 1971).
The PC underwent multiple phases of testing, study groups, pilot programs, and
program revision. Since its inception, it has experienced both positive and negative
reactions. The organization has three simple objectives, which at that time, were
considered alternatives to hard power. These objectives are: 1) “to help the countries
inviting volunteers to meet their needs for trained manpower; 2) to promote a better
understanding of Americans and American society and; 3) to promote in the American
people a broader understanding of other peoples” (Hapgood and Bennet, 1968). The
issues that arise within foreign policy appeared much simpler when the PC was created.
There was a straightforward dichotomy of good and bad the mission of the PC was to
alleviate some of the suffering in the world (Hapgood et al., 1968).
While the PC has experienced both increases and decreases in membership,
changes in administration, financial issues, shifting of foci (e.g.: to address such issues as
HIV/AIDS), and the inclusion of new countries, the mission has stayed the same. In the
1980s, one of the most important changes that occurred in the PC history was when
Congress passed legislation that created the PC as an independent federal agency within
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the executive branch. The President has the power to appoint the PC director and deputy
director, with appointments confirmed by the U.S. Senate (Peace Corps: History, 2009).
As an administrative organ, there is one acting director and one deputy director.
Additionally, there are three acting regional directors and an Inspector General (IG). The
IG is an independent office within the PC and provides oversight on most issues that
arise. General oversight of the PC is given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and the House Committee on International Relations. The budget for the PC is decided
annually, as a result of the congressional budget and appropriations process. This is
folded within the foreign operations budget and usually amounts to 1% of that budget.
For the 2009 fiscal year, the budget allotted to 330.8 million dollars (Peace Corps:
Management, 2009).
Since its inception, 195,000 people have volunteered in over 139 countries.
Currently, there are 7,876 volunteers serving in 70 posts in 76 countries. The focus of the
PC is on the following issue areas: Education 35%, Health and HIV/AIDS 21%, Business
15%, Environment 15%, Youth 5%, Agriculture 5%, Other 4%. Countries and regions
that are currently hosting PC operations are:
Eastern Caribbean, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Cambodia, China, Mongolia,
Philippines, Thailand, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,
Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Turkmenistan, Jordan, Morocco,
Fiji, Micronesia and Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,
Peru, and Suriname (Peace Corps: Countries, 2009).
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Since the PC is based in the U.S., the organization, activities, and actions of the
personnel are accountable to the Office of the Inspector General. As mentioned
previously, this office is an independent entity that works within the PC. The inspector
general reports to both the PC director and to Congress. Authorized by law, this office
conducts investigations and reviews of all programs and operations. This includes audits,
evaluations, oversight, and investigation of possible offenses (e.g.: theft, unexplained
deficiencies in federal funds, false statements, drug use, conflict of interest, ethics
violations, etc.) (Peace Corps: Inspector General, 2009). Internationally, the PC is subject
to the rules and laws of the host nation and as the U.S. has ratified the Geneva
Conventions, adheres to international humanitarian law.
While the PC is still primarily considered missionary in its application, the
mentality has shifted somewhat. Initially, the PC exuded neutral tendencies but over time,
this has changed. It is acknowledged that the PC has its own ideological tendencies and at
least during the Cold War, was used as a tool for foreign policy purposes (Wetzel, 1966).
Today, as foreign policy and international relations become increasingly complex, the
PC’s true motivation and purpose are viewed differently by different groups and nations.
Many believe it is no longer neutral but political in its nature.
Nonetheless, many still believe that the influence of the PC is a positive one, and
is seen as widening circles. The inner most circle represents the immediate effect of the
program “ (...) skills, knowledge, understanding, institution-building, framework for
cooperative effort with private organizations, research, and experiment (...).” The second
ring expands outward, encompassing the PC’s influence on society, peoples, and a
national sense of purpose. The third ring is one that seems to hold true for most
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humanitarian organizations. This is the universal idea that all people are of worth and
have a right to their intrinsic human dignity. The PC has been and continues to be seen as
the hope and effort to join (and rejoin) the different peoples of this world together
(Shriver, 1963).
Regarding the success of the PC, it is generally believed that the PC has had an
overall positive effect. It has provided aid and enhanced cross-cultural understanding
between many peoples and countries. In 1961 with the launch of the program, PC
volunteers were sent to only 6 countries. Now they have served in 139 countries and
multiple new programs have been developed. For example, new programs such as smallbusiness development, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the African Food Systems
Initiative have been created as the PC has expanded its focus and worked within new
nations and with new governments.
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS
The next international humanitarian organization to consider is Doctors Without
Borders, more commonly referred to as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). Although there
are some commonalities, this organization differs greatly from the PC. MSF was born out
of a schism within the ICRC in the late 1960s, specifically during the Biafra-Nigeria war.
The reason for the split is that one of the founding principles of the ICRC is neutrality.
MSF was created because its founders, while still believing in this principle, did not
accept the caveat that neutrality meant self-censorship, unable to speak out against
atrocities. Therefore, MSF claimed it could both witness and report specific atrocities,
while also reporting the larger political issues that might have led to them, something the
ICRC typically refrains from doing (Barnett et al., 2008).
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For this reason, MSF has been known as a more “rowdy” humanitarian
organization (Barnett et al., 2008). While MSF avoids any kind of actual political activity
and engagement (especially regarding armed conflict), it makes a statement that they find
it their duty to observe and report (Calhoun, 2008). MSF publicly states that “ (...) MSF
may speak out publicly to bring a forgotten crisis to public attention, to alert the public to
abuses occurring beyond the headlines, to criticize the inadequacies of the aid system, or
to challenge the diversion of humanitarian aid for political interests” (MSF: History,
2009).
The history behind the creation of MSF began, as mentioned previously, with a
break within the ICRC. Therefore, unlike the PC, it is not an organization created from
nothing but has a solid foundation from which it launched its own mission and goals. Its
main statement says that:
“ MSF provides aid in nearly 60 countries to people whose survival is threatened
by violence, neglect, or catastrophe, primarily due to armed conflict, epidemics,
malnutrition, exclusion from health care, or natural disasters. MSF provides
independent, impartial assistance to those most in need. MSF reserves the right to
speak out, to bring attention to neglected crises, to challenge inadequacies or
abuse of the aid system, and to advocate for improved medical treatments and
protocols” (MSF: History and Principles, 2009).
As an organization, it claims its birth in 1971, stemming from the efforts of
doctors and journalists in France. Like the PC, it is based on humanitarian principles, but
its main focus concerns medical ethics and impartiality. This means that the organization
operates as its own autonomous entity. It does not have any ties or obligations to political,
military, or religious groups or agendas. The main focus is to quickly bring quality
medical care and attention to any people or groups of people that are in the midst of a
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crisis, regardless of political affiliation, religion, or race (MSF: History, 2009). Initially
the organization was concerned with responding solely to emergency operations, but over
the last 40 years, the scope of the organization has gradually changed and evolved. MSF
now investigates and considers those humanitarian crises that might need long-term
attention. These include such issues as HIV/AIDS, sexual violence, and mental health
that could have serious social consequences. As such, solutions are not necessarily quick
or easy (Calhoun, 2008).
Regarding the administrative and organizational structure, this also proves
somewhat different from the PC, not only in structure but in size. MSF is more of an
international network of interweaving branches, rather than one, small, cohesive
organization. MSF, while originating in France, is much more of an international
organization. While it operates in a many countries, there are different branches of the
organization (“associative organizations”) that are found worldwide. There are 19
associative organizations in the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US (MSF: History, 2009).
Currently, there are more than 27,000 volunteers working for MSF. These include
doctors, nurses, epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, mental health professionals,
logistics experts, and administrators. The majority of these volunteers are from the
countries that are currently experiencing the crisis. (MSF: History, 2009). It is also a
unique organization because it is able to mobilize and deliver aid quickly, due to its
independent funding. Unlike the PC, which is reliant upon government funding and its
budget allowances, over 89% of the overall funding for MSF is derived from private
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sources. Around the world, as late as 2006, MSF had over 3 million private funders and
individual donors (MSF: History, 2009).
Those countries that have accepted assistance from MSF are:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dem. Rep. of Congo, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Laos,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (MSF:
Countries, 2009).
As stated previously, there are 19 associative organizations, each working as
autonomous entities. The associative organizations operate under the same MSF
guidelines and principles but experience some differences within their separate
organizations. Each association does report to a Board of Directors who are elected
during an annual general assembly (MSF: History, 2009). Additionally, the MSF, like the
PC, does follow and adhere to the rules stipulated by international humanitarian law.
Therefore, MSF is a fascinating and complex international humanitarian
organization. Unlike the PC, which appears fairly cohesive and straightforward, MSF
operates on a much bigger scale, with multiple interweaving branches. It also appears that
as an organization, it is surrounded by much more controversy as it claims impartiality,
but not neutrality. It does not actively engage, but it retains the right to speak out and
advocate against the wrongs faced by humanity.
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When measuring success, MSF does appear to have had some success. They
operate in many countries, a number that has increased over time. They won a Nobel
Peace Prize in 1999 as the organization expanded into “ (...) a multinational fixture of
emergency responses to international health crises (...) combining an air of urgency with
a critical sensibility (...) defining its mission in terms of “populations in
danger” (...)” (Calhoun, 2008). MSF has also had an impact on policy and people. Impact
on policy has come from speaking out and collaboration with different governments and
organizations. For example, MSF has created or taken part in some of the following
programs: vaccination campaigns, water and sanitation programs, campaign for access to
essential medicines, drugs for neglected disease initiative, and programs for ready-to-use
food (RUF). In 2006, MSF provided the following aid: “more than 9 million outpatient
consultations; hospitalized almost half a million patients; delivered 99,000 babies; treated
1.8 million people for malaria; treated 150,000 malnourished children; provided 100,000
people living with HIV/AIDS with antiretroviral therapy; vaccinated 1.8 million people
against meningitis; and conducted 64,000 surgeries” (MSF: Activities, 2009).
However, along with a more extensive reach comes more controversy. As MSF
does not necessarily follow a core principal of neutrality, sometimes the services they
offer and the activities they are engaged in are delayed or even refused. For example,
MSF was recently asked by the Sudanese government to leave. The government, with
multiple reasons, no longer required their services and now, the people caught in the
situation in Darfur are without the aid or assistance MSF had been providing. While not
confirmed, a possible reason for this expulsion could be that MSF has been politically
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active, speaking out and highlighting the activities that are occurring. MSF has created a
situation in which it no longer can provide humanitarian aid, due to its political stance.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)
The final organization to be considered is the International Committee of the Red
Cross. This is also a multifaceted and complex organization, proving paradoxical in
nature, like the other two organizations. It claims neutrality but has shown some political
tendencies. It is a private organization pursuing public goals but is also one of the biggest
and most influential organizations in the international humanitarian world. It strives for
liberal ends, but with conservative means. The ICRC, like the PC, is a product of
western-Judeo-Christian culture, with its roots founded in Christian charity. However,
while it is missionary in its application, it strives to be as non-denominational as possible
(Forsythe, 2005). The ICRC seems to be unlike the other organizations as it appears to
take on the form of a supranational body, delving into both humanitarian aid and
international humanitarian law.
Emerging from missionary roots, the birth of the ICRC came in the middle of the
19th century. European countries were flexing their military power and might and the
state was concerned only with the state, not the bodies left on the battlefield. Henry
Dunant, a Swiss businessman, stumbled upon the aftermath of the battle of Solferino in
1859, during the Italian wars of independence (Forsythe, 2005), and immersed himself by
helping where he could. Shortly after, he published A Memory of Solferino, describing his
experiences and proposing changes, in an attempt to remedy what he had seen in Italy.
Dunant’s book was an instant success, catching the attention of the chairman of the
Geneva Society for Public Welfare, Gustave Moynier. Moynier sought out Dunant and
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suggested that his proposals be submitted at the next meeting. Three other men were
assigned to investigate his proposal and along with Dunant and Moynier, they formed the
International Committee to Aid the Military Wounded. This group eventually evolved
into the ICRC (Finnemore, 1999).
It was decided that an international congress would be convened and any party
that was interested could attend. Participants would implement the proposals put forth by
Dunant in their home country. The effort to gather as many delegates as possible proved
fruitful at the Geneva conference in 1863, when 31 delegates were in attendance. (1863 is
the date considered to be the actual birth and implementation of the ICRC). Each country
was instructed to establish a national relief society in their country to provide aid to the
wounded casualties of war. These societies (later known as the Red Cross Societies) were
to be private and voluntary in nature, and had to obtain recognition from national
governments. They were only allowed to enter and give aid in times of war when invited
by the military of that nation (Finnemore, 1999).
In 1864, there was a second convention at Geneva which established the
international agreement marking ICRC volunteers and a neutrality status was recognized.
This convention also provided the principal provisions of the ICRC, which laid the
groundwork for constructing a treaty-based law of war (when before, laws of war had
been based solely on customary law or legal opinion) (Finnemore, 1999).
The main principle of the ICRC focuses on the “ (...) safeguarding of the basic
worth and welfare of individuals in distress in conflict situations” (Forsythe, 2005).
However, the agreed upon principal provisions of the 1984 Convention are as follows:
“1) Ambulances, military hospitals, medical personnel, and the administrative, transport
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and quartermasters’ staff which supports these will all have neutral status; 2) In the event
of enemy occupation, these neutral personnel shall have the right to continue to carry out
their functions. When they choose to return to their units, this return shall be facilitated
by occupying forces; 3) Hospital materials captured may be retained by the occupying
forces; ambulances may not; 4) Inhabitants of the country who provide aid to the
wounded shall be respected and remain free. Generals of belligerent powers have a duty
to notify those inhabitants of the neutrality such humane conduct will confer; 5) Wounded
and sick combatants shall be collected and cared for. Those recovered, if unfit for further
service, must be repatriated. Those fit for service shall be repatriated on the condition that
they not take up arms again for the duration of the hostilities. Evacuation parties
conducting these repatriation operations shall be neutral and; 6) Personnel, hospitals, and
ambulances enjoying neutral status shall wear the emblem of neutrality, a red cross on a
white background” (Finnemore, 1999).
Interestingly, since the ICRC was the organ that promoted the creation of national
aid societies, a large part of their early focus was on development. This helps to explain
the dual focus of the ICRC, regarding both the practical applications (the work in the
field) and the legal standards. Consequently, the ICRC is seen as a governing body,
lessening the tensions of war or attempting to stop or mitigate the escalation of violence.
From the end of the 19th century through the 20th, the ICRC witnessed a variety of
changes, as did the other organizations. As the world was changing and evolving, new
crises were emerging, and world wars were wreaking havoc on the international
community. In response, the ICRC had to adapt and change as well. For example, after
the first world war, the ICRC began to investigate more closely the conditions for
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detainees of war, not only in the international field but beyond, to include internal
warfare as well (Forsythe, 2005). The ICRC now address more issues, including:
biotechnology and weapons, land-mines, missing persons, women and war, children in
war, war and displacement, social research on war, refugees, weapons, national
implementation, and development (ICRC: About the ICRC, 2009).
Regarding the organizational and administrative structure of the ICRC, it is a
vastly complex organization. The organization is structured as follows: an Assembly (the
supreme governing body), in which the president resides; an Assembly Council, a
Recruitment Commission, a Control Commission, and an Internal Audit; a Directorate,
which is the second tier of power; and a multitude of other organizations found below the
Directorate (Forsythe, 2005). Currently, there are 1,400 people working in the field for
the ICRC with 11,000 acting as support personnel. The headquarters are in Geneva,
which has a staff of 800. Funding is provided by contributions from “the states that are
party to the Geneva Conventions, both the National Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, supranational organizations, and public and private sources. All funding is
voluntary” (ICRC: Funding and Budget, 2009).
Currently there is ICRC staff in 80 countries and the following are those countries
that have allowed the ICRC to enter:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen,
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Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Albania,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Lester, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vietnam, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, US, Uruguay, and Venezuela (ICRC: History, 2009).
While a large emphasis is on medical assistance and victims of war, as mentioned
earlier, the ICRC plays a substantial role in the international community, not only with
medical assistance but with legal standards and IHL. Therefore, it could be argued that
the magnitude and reach of the ICRC is much greater than the other two. Also, it has an
interesting role due to its legal mandate from the international community that states, in
accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “ (...) task the ICRC with visiting
prisoners, organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families and similar
humanitarian activities during armed conflicts and; the statutes of the IRC and Red Cross
Movement which encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence
where the Geneva Conventions do not apply” (ICRC: Mandate, 2009).
The question of whether the ICRC has remained neutral is still controversial.
According to David Forsythe, “The ICRC, for instance, works famously behind the
scenes, believing (...) this quintessentially apolitical agency sees its role as spreading
humanitarian norms and changing national laws and international norms - that is, it is
involved in “humanitarian politics”.” However, some criticism of the ICRC is that it has
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been too silent on certain situations, by claiming neutrality (e.g.: not speaking out during
the Holocaust) (Barnett et al., 2008).
The ICRC has been successful as over time as there has been an increase in the
number of countries in which the ICRC has operated, the number of branch societies,
(Red Cross and Red Crescent), and the aid that has been provided over the years to many
different countries and peoples. It has been awarded four Nobel Peace Prizes (three to the
organization and one to Henry Dunant). To give an example of its impact, the following
activities were conducted by the ICRC in 2007: “food for more than 2.5 million people
and emergency supplies such as tents and blankets for almost 4 million people; its water,
sanitation and construction projects supported 14.3 million people; around 2.9 million,
more than half of them children, benefited from ICRC supported health care facilities;
delegates visited 518,277 people deprived of their freedom in 2,425 places of detention in
77 countries; in collaboration with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
around 485,000 messages were exchanged between family members separated by
hostilities and other crises” (ICRC: Annual Report 2007, 2009).
CHAPTER FIVE
Empirical Analysis: Measuring the Relationship
This section investigates the three variables which measure the receptivity of
regime type towards INGOs. Again, these variables are the following: the number of
years each of the 3 INGOs have been present in each country; the amount of funding
given to each country by each INGO and; the number of volunteers sent by each INGO to
each country. This is done to see if there is one specific regime type that works best with
a humanitarian INGO. These variables, acting as proxies for the relationship, are ones I
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believe to be the most useful for determining if one regime type can be isolated as the
best for fostering the most successful relationship with INGOs.
As previously mentioned, the three variables are measured within the four
categories of regime types. The categorization of regime types is as follows: democracy,
autocracy, transition, and interruption. This categorization was created in an attempt to
cohesively view and analyze a significant amount of data over a long period of time. This
categorization was used to provide both an aggregate perspective for all 12 countries, a
broad view, as well as a disaggregated perspective, providing a closer, more
individualistic look at one country per regime category.
With the first three variables, the data for each country was added, with the
information available, and then divided by the number of countries within that
categorization, to provide the average. Data was compiled from all 3 of the INGOs for
this calculation. For example, when looking at the regime categorization of autocracy,
two countries are represented, Rwanda and Tanzania. According to the Polity IV score,
these are countries that have always been autocratic. The number of years each INGO
has been present in each country were added together, and the total number was divided
by 2, the number of countries in that category, to provide the average. The same
calculation was done for the amount of funding given and the number of volunteers that
were sent by each INGO. These numbers provide the average score for all categories,
democracy, autocracy, transition, and interruption. This is done in both the aggregate and
disaggregate manner as otherwise, the data cannot be fully explored and understood
because there is so much variation and fluctuation of regime types in these countries. It
should also be noted that this method of categorization was created for functional
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purposes as well, as there was inconsistency with the data. For some of the variables,
various years were missing, or not accessible. Due to a lack of data, this was the best way
in which to provide the most consistent measurement possible.
The aggregate perspective and analysis of the 12 countries will be followed by 4
individual and specific case studies, investigating one country from each regime type
categorization. These case studies will more closely investigate the specific political and
civil situations of each country and what factors might be affecting either the need or the
demand for humanitarian INGOs.
The first variable measured is the length of time (number of years) that INGOs
have been present in all the countries. The data shows the number for all 3 of the INGOs,
(PC, MSF, and ICRC) added together and then divided by the number of countries
assigned within each category. This simply illustrates when each of these INGOs entered
into the countries and how long they have maintained a presence. To reiterate, the
following are the number of countries in each category: Autocracy (2); Democracy (1);
Transition (5); Interruption (4).
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Figure 6: Total Years of INGO Presence
Total Years of INGO Presence
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Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
As can be seen, on average, those countries in the transition category have had the
longest presence of humanitarian INGOs. Transition is followed by interruption,
autocracy, and then democracy. This could suggest a variety of possibilities. Transition
regimes are in greater need for humanitarian assistance, as they are experiencing
fluctuations in regime type. This is supported by the fact that they are closely followed by
interruption regimes. Countries experiencing instability, subjected to constant change of
governance, and difficulty in growing and/or progressing, could have a greater need for
assistance. These regime types are also more prone, due to their instability, to man made
crises, as well as being more susceptible and unable to deal with natural crises. As there is
constant shifting and vying for power in the government, this leads to more fighting,
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displacement of peoples, domestic issues, weak infrastructure, and much more. This
instability leads to an inability to deal with major problems that might arise.These are
some reasons that these regimes could have, or require more, INGO assistance and
presence.
In addition, autocracies follow closely in third position in terms of INGO
presence, with democracies having the least amount of presence. What this could suggest
is that there has been less need or demand for INGO presence in democratic
environments. If so, there would be fewer issues of access, as there is simply less
interaction between this regime type and INGOs. What is interesting is that the other
three regime types appear to have allowed, for the most part, the presence of
humanitarian INGOs into their countries, suggesting that they do allow for aid and
assistance when needed. Therefore, their demand and need might be higher than that of
democracies. Ultimately, while it is difficult to determine if this means that democracies
have better relationships, when using this variable, it does show that there are simply
more relationships and greater levels of interaction with these three regime types and the
INGOs.
The second variable measures the total amount of funding from all 3 INGOs.
Again, the numbers shown for funding were calculated from all 3 INGOs for each
specific regime category. This total number was then divided by the number of countries
in each category to provide the average. These numbers represent the funding given per
year from each INGO, when that information was available. In some instances, funding
was given to regions. When this occurred, the funding for the region (in which there
might be more than one country) was simply divided by how many countries were
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included in that region and equally distributed. For example, the ICRC allotted money
regionally. In the Nairobi region, the countries of Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania were
included. Therefore, the total amount given to that region was divided by three, equally
distributing the funds across all the countries, and then added to the whole.
Figure 7: Total Amount of INGO Funding
Total Amount of Funding
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Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)

This graph shows that the least amount of funding has been sent to democracies.
Rather, interruption regimes have received the most amount of funding, followed by
autocracies, transitions, and then democracies. While this changes the order compared to
INGO presence, democracies again are the countries that come in last, with the least
amount of funding. This coincides with the first variable meaning with more INGO
presence, there is typically more funding. The next graph illustrates the same concept,
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except it is showing the total number of volunteers for each category. The number of
volunteers per year was taken, added together for all 3 INGOs for each country, and then
divided by the number of countries within that category.
Figure 8: Total of Volunteer Numbers
Total of Volunteer Numbers
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Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)

As can be seen, the number of volunteers is greatest in those countries in the
interruption category, followed by transition, democracy, and closely behind, autocracy.
These results show, in correlation with the first two variables tested, that democratic
countries, while not last, are close to last regarding the total number of volunteers that
have operated within their country. Overall, it can be stated that democracies have had the
least amount of presence and funding, and the second to lowest in terms of volunteer
numbers. As such, it can’t be conclusively stated whether this data suggests that other
regime types may be better suited to fostering the most conducive and best relationship
88

possible with these INGOs. However, it can be stated that democracies have had less
relationships and interactions with these INGOs (due to varying levels of need or
demand). This data also shows that all other regime categories (autocracy, transition, and
interruption) have had high levels of interaction with all 3 INGOs. They have fostered
relationships with these organizations while receiving a much larger amount of funding,
number of volunteers, and greatest INGO presence, far above that of democratic regimes.
To more simply illustrate this data, the following graphs show the disaggregate
perspective, looking at the individual countries within each of these categories of regime
type, to expound upon the findings that are beginning to appear. Therefore, the numbers
below represent only one country, but again using data from all 3 INGOs. As with the
aggregate data, and continuing to use the same method of categorization, INGO presence,
funding amount, and volunteer numbers were calculated for all 3 INGOs and added
together. This time however, the numbers represent only one country. Tanzania is used
for autocracy, South Africa for democracy, Zambia for transition, and Sudan for
interruption.

89

Figure 9: Years of INGO Presence
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When investigating individual countries, Sudan as the representative of the
interruption category has had the greatest presence of INGOs. Sudan is followed by
Tanzania (autocracy), Zambia (transition), and finally South Africa (democracy). Again,
as the aggregate data showed, it should be questioned as to why democracies have had
the least amount of INGO presence. Is this due to a bad relationship or problems between
these INGOs and a democratic regime? Is this because democracies have a better political
and civil environment, better equipped to dealing with crises that arise? Do they simply
experience less crises? Perhaps it shouldn’t be assumed that democracies have had the
best relationship with humanitarian INGOs, as they seem to have fewer relationships
overall. They might have good relationships but their interaction is fairly minimal
compared to the other regime types. Therefore, if this is the case, autocratic, transition,
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and interruption regimes might have better relationships simply because they have more
of them, and because their need or demand is greater.
The following graphs show the same individual countries and the numbers from
the 3 INGOs regarding total funding and volunteers.
Figure 10: Total Funding of all INGOS (disaggregate)
Total Funding of all INGOs
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Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)
For individual countries, the pattern again follows that of the aggregated data.
Sudan has received the most funding from all the INGOs. Tanzania follows next, Zambia,
and finally South Africa. This is the exact pattern provided by the aggregated data.
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Figure 11: Number of Volunteers from all INGOs
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While the data regarding volunteers doesn’t exactly match the aggregate data, it
does show, yet again, that non-democratic regimes, interruption and autocratic regimes,
have had higher numbers of volunteers. The number of volunteers has been highest in
Sudan, followed by Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia.
What the data shows is that democracies are not the regimes that have had the
longest INGO presence, nor have they received the most amount of funding, or the
greatest number of volunteers. Other regime types, autocracies, transitions, and
interruptions are the regime types with greater numbers when using these three variables.
Therefore, it is again prudent to ask why this might be the case. As discussed in
the theoretical section of this thesis, there are many possibilities to pursue. Do
democracies work best with humanitarian INGOs because of their democratic political
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environment and civil society? Or as the data suggests, are democracies simply better
able to handle natural disasters and crises, experience less man made crises, due to the
stability of their governance and regime type? Is there just less need or demand for these
types of INGOs? Do other regime types, because of a higher need and/or demand, have
better relationships with INGOs simply because there is more interaction and exposure to
these INGOs? What are the variables that can affect these relationships? The next section
offers 4 cases studies, looking at South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Sudan, to
investigate the internal characteristics of each country to see if there are other reasons and
variables that could explain INGO activity.
INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES
The 4 case studies offered in this section investigate one country from each
regime category: South Africa (democracy), Tanzania (autocracy), Zambia (transition),
and Sudan (interruption). Each country case study mentions the 5 variables mentioned
earlier, as well as an historical analysis which looks at the political, social, and economic
environments. In addition, the variables regarding INGO presence, funding, and
volunteers are discussed here, as the data is broken down individually to be more closely
assessed. Natural disasters are also investigated, to see if the timing of natural disasters
correlated with any significant increases or decreases in INGO activity. This is all done in
an attempt to better understand why there might be more or less INGO activity in a
country with a certain regime type. As the earlier analysis suggests, democracies are not
the regime types with the most INGO activity. As such, they might not be fostering the

93

best relationship out of the regime types discussed here. We need to know more about
why this might be the case, as the previous findings remain inconclusive.
SOUTH AFRICA
Table 2: Descriptive Variables for South Africa
Five Variables

Result

Natural Disasters / Man Made Since 1980, 70 events;
Disasters
1,721 people killed;
18,420,182 affected;
mass movt 1; extreme
temperature 2; earthquake 6;
epidemic 6; drought 7;
wildfire 8; storm 17; flood 23
Historical Conflict

Much historical conflict;
apartheid movement

Regime Stability

Stability more recently, but
little in South Africa’s past

Natural Resources

Many significant natural
resources

Regime Type Currently

9 on Polity IV Scale

South Africa is the country representing the democracy category. According to the
polity IV scale, South Africa has always been a democracy, beginning in 1910. The
following years show the various polity scores South Africa has been given on the polity
IV scale, over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in
parentheses: 1910-1989: 4 (80 years); 1990-1991: 5 (5 years); 1992-1993: -88 (2 years)
and; 2004-2008: 9 (15 years). The graph illustrates the polity2 score where only true
value polity scores are shown. This is to show the fluctuation, or stability, of the polity
scores denoting regime type and governance for South Africa over a significant period of
time.
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Figure 12: South Africa Polity 2 Score

South Africa
9
7
5
2
0

1950 1958 1966 1974 1982 1990 1998 2006

polity2
As can be seen, South Africa has always remained on the democratic side of the
polity scale. What is intriguing about South Africa is that despite being labeled as
democratic for so many years, it has experienced the least amount of INGO presence, in
addition to very low levels of funding and volunteers (in comparison with the other
countries). Out of the 12 countries studied here, South Africa is last for the amount of
INGO presence. Specifically, the 3 INGOs entered in the following years: PC: 1997 (13
years); ICRC: 1995 (15 years) and; MSF: 1999 (11 years).
The following graphs represent the individual numbers for South Africa, looking
at funding and volunteers for each INGO.
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Figure 13: ICRC Funding for South Africa
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Figure 14: MSF Funding for South Africa
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Figure 15: PC Funding for South Africa
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Figure 16: ICRC Volunteers for South Africa
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Figure 17: MSF Volunteers for South Africa
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As one can see, the ICRC’s funding has increased while MSF has seen fluctuation
in their numbers and the PC has steadily increased since 1997, only dropping recently in
2007. The number of volunteers tells a similar story. In 2002, the number of ICRC
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volunteers increased while the volunteers for MSF dramatically decreased. The PC has
seen a steady increase (with a few moments of decline), since 1997. When compared to
the other three countries in these specific case studies, Tanzania, Zambia, and Sudan,
South Africa is the last in terms of INGO presence and funding, and second to last in
terms of volunteers. While there is an obvious lack of data regarding the number of years
for each INGO (as this data was not publicly available), this still presents a small glimpse
into each country. When compared to the other countries and despite being a democratic
country, South Africa is well behind the others, having very low levels of volunteers,
funding, and INGO presence. Moreover, there are not any significant patterns when
analyzing this data.
Natural disasters were also investigated, to see if there were any patterns between
these variables and the timing of natural disasters. As assistance is typically needed to
mitigate the impact and help with the aftermath of natural disasters, if there is a
correlation between increased INGO activity and the timing of natural disasters, this
could be a possible, supportive, explanation for INGO activity. In South Africa in the last
50 years, there have been 70 natural disasters, which is the second highest of the 12
countries and first highest of the other three individual countries. The graphs below
illustrate the number of people that were both killed and affected during this time. The
natural disasters in this analysis, for all the countries, include the following: drought,
insect infestation, flood, epidemic, wildfire, storm, extreme temperature, and earthquake.
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Figure 19: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in South Africa
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Figure 20: Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters in South Africa
15000000
11250000
7500000
3750000
0

1984

1987

1995

2001

South Africa: Affected
(PreventionWeb, 2010)

100

2004

However, as can be seen, there is no correlation with the timing of natural
disasters and INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. Therefore, the data in these graphs
present a complex picture. Why is it that INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers
are less, in a country that has been democratic for a generation, when I would expect
INGO presence to be greatest in a country with this type of regime? INGOs should be
present here, if my hypothesis remains true. To that end, an investigation into South
Africa’s history is required, to search for possible explanatory reasons as to why there is
less INGO presence in this country.
The history of South Africa is a complicated one as it has seen much turbulence
and change for various reasons. South Africa is also a leader, not only on the African
continent, but in the global context which makes her story extremely significant. Dutch
traders landed in 1652 and were the ruling presence until the British arrived in 1806.
South Africa is extremely wealthy in natural resources and such commodities as gold and
diamonds spurred both wealth and immigration. After the Boer War ended in 1902, South
Africa operated under the rule of apartheid, creating a separation in the development of
races. In 1910, independence was achieved and the British and Afrikaners ruled together
as a republic until 1961, after a whites-only referendum occurred. In 1948, a national
party was voted in as the majority party and the policy of apartheid and the separate
development of races, favoring the white minority, was officially put in place (CIA World
Factbook, 2010).
With apartheid came massive problems and diverse and separated communities
were extreme. Social engineering of society included such things as forced resettlement
and horrific tactics against opponents which resulted in years of conflict and strife, the
101

cost of which is still being felt today (BBC South Africa Country Profile, 2010). The
years between 1948 and 1950 saw the codifying and enforcing of increasingly strict
policies for racial separation (State Department South Africa Country Profile, 2010).
While resistance against apartheid began early, efforts were not truly consolidated and
opposition initiated, by the African National Congress (ANC), until the late 1950s with
guerrilla warfare. In the two decades following, there were massive uprisings, including
internal protests, insurgency, and boycotts.
It wasn’t until 1989, due to much internal pressure and resistance, that the regime
eventually began to negotiate for change, including a peaceful transition to majority rule.
In addition to internal pressure, civil unrest, and the increasing power of the ANC, there
was a corresponding increase in international pressure. The international community was
not pleased with the conditions in Africa and therefore, the South African government
was feeling pressure to change (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). In
1994, South Africa had its first multiracial election, with Nelson Mandel winning as
President. Mandela pushed for reform on many fronts, especially those concerning social
issues. Unemployment, housing, crime, economic growth and stability, and the effort to
decrease political violence were all attacked with vigor (State Department South Africa
Country Profile, 2010). Since 1994, the elections following have been considered mostly
fair and free and in 1996, a new constitution was adopted, one considered to be one of the
most liberal in the world (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). In 1998
apartheid was officially deemed as a crime against humanity and in 2004 the ANC won
and enacted the “Black Economic Empowerment” program to address economic
inequalities (World Information South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Therefore, as South
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Africa has seen an increase in political stability, there has been a corresponding increase
in economic stability.
South Africa is currently represented by 9 provinces, with the same person
occupying the role of chief of state and head of government. In the past, South Africa had
been divided into 4 provinces and 10 black homelands. However, even with this new
division, there is still tension between the provincial and local administrators, at times
causing disagreement and stagnation as both parties vie for power. There is a cabinet, a
bicameral parliament, the president is elected by the national assembly, and there is a set
code of ethics for the senior positions.
Despite the setbacks of apartheid, South Africa is still the most developed country
on the continent. It has the most sophisticated economy with a quarter of the GDP and
agriculturally, South Africa is very diverse with a plethora of natural resources, including
minerals, gold, and platinum. While not perfect, the economy is highly diverse and open,
which is attracting FDI from many countries. However, while having many natural
resources and being seen as a leading international player and regional mediator, South
Africa is not without problems (US State Department South Africa Profile, 2010).
Despite the progress, South Africa has continued to struggle to address apartheid (BBC
South Africa Country Profile, 2010). What must be highlighted is the extreme
exclusionary nature of apartheid, which in turn creates great isolation. This means that the
disparities created in the social, political, and economic spheres of South Africa are still
very prominent.
Complicating the situation is that South Africa has to contend with the second
highest number of HIV/AIDS patients in the world, while experiencing problems with
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land redistribution (a component left over from the apartheid struggle), territorial issues,
trafficking, drugs, a multitude of religions, and deep and continued ethnic division. Black
Africans make up 79% of the people in South Africa, with 9.6% white, 8.9% colored, and
2.5% Indian/Asian (US State Department South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Over half
the population lives in poverty with little access to any kind of assistance. While political
violence has dropped, crime, corruption, violence, and general breakdown of law and
order persists. There is also high unemployment and low wages in a population that is
increasing (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Nevertheless, the
consensus regarding South Africa is that positive strides are being made, despite having
to overcome colossal obstacles from the past (US State Department South Africa Profile,
2010).
Therefore, what are possible reasons that could explain why there is less INGO
activity in this country? According to the original hypothesis, with democratic countries,
there should be greater INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. South Africa shows this
is not the case. At the conclusion of the case studies, I will present three alternative
explanations that might help explain INGO activity and the variables used here. I created
these alternative explanations to see if one is better able to explain greater or lesser INGO
presence, the factors that contribute to that presence, and if one can then be applied to all
the countries.
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TANZANIA
Table 3: Descriptive Variables for Tanzania
Five Variables

Result

Natural Disasters / Man Made Since 1980, 65 events;
Disasters
6,747 killed; 8,711,959
affected; insect infestation 1;
mass movt. 1; storm 1;
wildfire 1; earthquake 5;
drought 6; flood 24; epidemic
26
Historical Conflict

Little historical conflict

Regime Stability

Relative regime stability

Natural Resources

Not many natural resources,
mostly minerals, but popular
tourist destination

Regime Type Currently

-1 on Polity IV Scale

Tanzania is the country representative for autocracy. According to the polity IV
scale, since 1961, Tanzania has always been autocratic. The following years show the
various polity scores Tanzania has been given on the polity IV scale over the last 60
years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in parentheses: 1961-1991:
-6 (31 years); 1992-1994: -5 (3 years); 1995-2008: -1 (14 years). These years are
illustrated on the graph below. Again, this is to show the fluctuation, or stability, of the
polity scores denoting regime type and governance for Tanzania over a significant period
of time.
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Figure 21: Tanzania Polity Score
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In comparison to the other three countries in these case studies, Tanzania has the
second greatest numbers for all the variables. Behind Sudan, Tanzania is second for
having the longest INGO presence, amount of funding, and volunteer numbers. Out of the
entire 12 countries studied here, Tanzania is 7th. Therefore, as an autocracy, contrary to
South Africa’s status as a democracy, Tanzania has had a large amount of INGO activity.
The 3 INGOs entered Tanzania in the following years: PC: 1972 (32 years); ICRC: n/a;
MSF: 1993 (17 years).
The following graphs represent the individual numbers for funding and volunteers
for Tanzania.
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Figure 22: PC Funding for Tanzania
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Figure 23: MSF Funding for Tanzania
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Figure 24: ICRC Funding for Tanzania
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Figure 25: PC Volunteers for Tanzania
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Figure 26: MSF Volunteers for Tanzania
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Figure 27: ICRC Volunteers for Tanzania
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Regarding funding, while the MSF only offers three years of information, there
appears to be a decline in funding recently. However, both the PC and the ICRC show
signs of increased funding, with a large spike in 2002. Overall, the PC is the INGO which
is shows consistently increased funding over time. There is a similar pattern with
volunteer numbers. The MSF has seen a rather sharp decrease in volunteers over time,
while the PC shows a steady increase of volunteers and the number of ICRC volunteers
spiked early in this decade. This data simply shows that Tanzania, the autocracy, has the
second greatest amount of INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers. This is
contrary to the initial hypothesis of this thesis.
When looking at the natural disasters that have occurred in the last 50 years,
Tanzania has experienced 65 natural disasters, which is fifth highest of the 12 countries
and third highest of the three individual countries. The graphs below show the total
number of people killed and affected by these natural disasters.
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Figure 28: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in Tanzania
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Figure 29: Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters in Tanzania
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The one possible correlation with the variables mentioned above is seen during
the early part of this decade. There was an increase in funding and volunteer numbers (for
the ICRC and the PC) during the same time that many people were affected in the early
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2000s by a natural disaster. This could suggest that more INGO activity was needed, as
Tanzania might have been unable to cope with the natural disaster. Otherwise, there is no
real correlation that can be seen between increases or decreases of variables and the
timing of natural disasters in this country. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the data
for Tanzania suggests the opposite of the hypothesis of this paper. Tanzania has shown
that overall, it has more INGO activity than South Africa, the democratic country. An
investigation into Tanzania’s history will consider why this might be the case.
Tanzania, unlike some of her neighbors, has had an unusually quiet history, with
little internal conflict or strife. Tanzania slowly transformed over time, when Zanzibar
split and Tanganyika was formed, under British and German rule. After World War I,
Germany left the country and Tanzania finally gained independence from Britain in the
early 1960s. The country was formed by Tanganyika and Zanzibar merging into one,
ushered in with the mentality that if there was to be one state, there would be one party to
rule (CIA World Factbook, 2010).
Julius Nyerere, a schoolteacher trained abroad, stepped in as President in 1961.
With the mentality that there would be one party in one, whole, state, much emphasis was
placed on social policies. Social practices were heavily enforced to forge a strong,
national identity in which all Tanzanians could join together. Tanzanian national identity
was created and shaped, in which ethnic, regional, or linguistic identities were and are
much less significant for the Tanzanian people. According to the U.S. State Department,
“Observers are nearly unanimous in attributing Tanzania’s unbroken record of political
stability to Nyerere’s social policies.” Nyerere ruled his single party until 1985,
enhanced by the constitution of 1977 which declared a real one-party state for the entire
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country, with no other party opposition allowed. Nyerere eventually stepped down in
1985 when President Mwinyi took power, but one party rule was not abolished until 1995
(U.S. State Department Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
While Nyerere had excellent social policies, his economic policies typically
manifested as failures. Under Nyerere, his party supposedly rejected communism and
desired not isolation, but wanted foreign assistance, intervention, and aid. Despite this
claim, Nyerere and his “Arusha Declaration” called for egalitarianism, socialism, and
self-reliance, which actually turned Tanzania inward. Nyerere relied mostly on
cooperative farm villages, with familial and communal ties as the foundation for the
nation, but along with the nationalization of factories, plantations, banks, and private
companies. Very little clear and efficient focus however, was directed at these economic
reforms. Nyerere was more focused on uniting the Tanzanian people and he was devoted
to enforcing social policies and practices. In addition, undermining any real success and
what caused most of these attempts at economic reform to fail was inefficiency,
corruption, and resistance to economic changes, both internal and external to the
government. Exacerbating the situation was when Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, to
force the dictator Idi Amin to flee. This proved extremely costly to the Tanzanian
government, both financially and with state resources, a setback that took many years to
recover from (BBC Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
One party rule lasted until 1995, after changes had been made to the constitution
in 1992 in which multiparty politics were allowed. Democratic elections were held, but
under accusations of unfair elections resulting in rioting and clashes on the streets
(WorldInformation, 2010). The 2005 elections were considered free and fair, with some
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opposition allowed, but not much. As such, it has been a slow process to allow other
voices and parties into the political mix (US State Department Tanzania Country Profile,
2010). There has been a political union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania for over
forty years, but Zanzibar does have its own parliament and president (BBC Tanzania
Country Profile, 2010).
Currently, Tanzania has 26 regions, a chief of state and head of government that
are officiated by the same person, a president elected by popular vote, and a unicameral
national assembly. With a GDP of 57.5 billion, many believe that while there is much
political stability, there is still slow growth and economic reform, despite the help of the
IMF (BBC Tanzania Country Profile, 2010). The slow economic growth and
development is very much attributed to Nyerere and his poor economic policies, policies
which produced a weak and inefficient infrastructure for Tanzania to successfully build
upon. Initially, in the early 1990s the IMF and the WB were deeply invested in helping
Tanzania, as the country was adopting their liberal practices. However, that aid has since
stagnated as Tanzania has been unable to show real signs of growth and improvement and
their industry infrastructure remains weak. Corruption and weak opposition parties
remain which implies that little legislature is being successfully created and passed.
Foreign investors are also wary because there is a history of Tanzanian courts being
unable to enforce contracts and the bureaucracy tends to be hostile. To invest in a country
that continues to have a poor infrastructure, little economic growth, an inability to uphold
contracts, and which exudes hostility, would prove to be a great risk (U.S. State
Department Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
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Within civil society, Tanzania has had and continues to have its share of issues. As
mentioned previously, there are still major problems with elections and one party has
been holding power for the last several years, despite the multiparty politics that are now
allowed. Therefore, the government still controls much what happens in the everyday life
of the Tanzanian people. They control the courts and media, the public can’t strike, and
corruption and the drug trade are still very active (Freedom House Tanzania Country
Profile, 2010). Tanzania also suffers from a high adult infection of the HIV/AIDS virus
(12th in the world), a high risk of infectious diseases, and they host over 1/2 million
refugees, more than any other country (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Their debt is over 8
billion and while there are a few natural resources such as hydropower, tin, phosphates,
iron, and diamonds, these are limited. More effort is focused on drawing in tourists with
such attractions as Mt. Kilimanjaro (U.S. State Department Tanzania Country Profile,
2010).
Despite the issues seen here, Tanzania, because she has been so politically stable,
with little internal strife, does have good relations with neighboring countries and acts as
a mediator. 99% of the people are African, but there are a plethora of different religious
groups, including the following: Christian 30%; Muslim 35%; and Indigenous 35%
(mainland) (US State Department Tanzania Profile, 2010). However, the emphasis placed
on Tanzanian national identity, planted many years ago, remains strong. The cohesion of
people under one identity has largely diffused possible ethnic, religious, and cultural
rivalries, a problem that is very apparent for other countries in this study. Moreover,
NGOs, according to Freedom House, are very active in Tanzania and have been seen to
influence public policy (Freedom House Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
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Therefore, while Tanzania still struggles economically, socially, a solid foundation
has been laid and is significant for the people of Tanzania today. Also significant is that
Tanzania, as an autocracy, has had a greater amount of INGO presence, along with more
funding and volunteers than South Africa.
ZAMBIA
Table 4: Descriptive Variables for Zambia
Five Variables

Result

Natural Disasters / Man Made Since 1982, 32 events;
Disasters
998 killed; 8,719,915
affected; insect infestation 1;
drought 5; flood 11; epidemic
15
Historical Conflict

Some historical conflict

Regime Stability

One party rule for a long
time, lack of flexibility

Natural Resources

Hugely dependent on copper
but insufficient to use only
one natural resource

Regime Type Currently

7 on Polity IV Scale

Zambia is the country representing the regime category of transition. Countries in
this category are countries that experienced an autocratic rule for a long period of time,
followed by a few years of transition, and have now experienced a long period under a
democratic rule. These countries saw few interruptions or fluctuations in regime type.
Rather, one regime type ruled for a very long time, followed by a second regime type.
The following years show the various polity scores Zambia has been given on the polity
IV scale over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in
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parentheses: 1967-1971: 0 (4 years);1972-1990: -9 (19 years); 1991-1995: 6 (5 years);
1996-2000: 1 (5 years); 2001-2007: 5 (7 years) and; 2008: 7 (1 year). Essentially, the
transition for Zambia from one major regime rule to another looks like this: 1967-1990:
Autocracy (23 years), 1990-1991: Transition (2 years), and 1991-present: Democracy (19
years). The graph below shows these polity scores over time.
Figure 30: Zambia Polity 2 Score
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What can be ascertained from this graph is that while under an autocratic rule,
Zambia stayed for a long time at -9 on the polity scale until 1990, when they began the
transition to a democracy. Since 1991, Zambia has been labeled as democratic but as
shown, there have been fluctuations within that score. Zambia has moved up and down
the polity scale, on the democratic side. When I speak of a transition period, it is noted
that creating democracy and establishing democratic markers in a country does not
happen instantly. Therefore, the fluctuations on the polity scale are explained by the fact
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that democratization is a process, one that takes years and is not perfect. However, as of
2001, Zambia has seen a relatively steady increase on the polity scale.
When compared to the other three countries in these case studies, Zambia has had
the second lowest (in front of South Africa) amount of INGO presence and funding, and
the lowest number of volunteers. Out of the 12 countries, Zambia is tied for 3rd least
amount of INGO presence. The 3 INGOs entered during the following years (all INGOs
entered after the transition to democracy): PC: 1993 (17 years); ICRC: 1995 (15 years);
MSF: 1999 (11 years). The following graphs represent the individual numbers for
Zambia, regarding funding and volunteers.
Figure 31: PC Funding for Zambia
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Figure 32: MSF Funding for Zambia
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Figure 33: ICRC Funding for Zambia
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Figure 34: PC Volunteers for Zambia
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Figure 35: MSF Volunteers for Zambia
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Figure 36: ICRC Volunteers for Zambia
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Funding for the PC steadily increases over time and ICRC funding increases as
well, dramatically so in 2000. MSF seems to have shown an increase from 2004 to 2006,
with a slight decline since 2007. The number of volunteers that each INGO has sent
seems to correlate well with the funding that each INGO has given. The PC shows a
steady increase in the number of volunteers over time while MSF shows both increases
and decreases in volunteer numbers, but dropping off significantly in recent years. The
ICRC shows a steady increase as well, only seeming to level off in the number of
volunteers in the last few years.
While this data shows general increases for Zambia regarding the amount of
funding and volunteers, when compared to the other three countries, Zambia is still
second to last for INGO presence and funding, and last for volunteer numbers. What is
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interesting however, is that as a transition country, Zambia has overall, had more INGO
presence and activity than South Africa has had, as a democracy.
Like the other country case studies, natural disasters that occurred in the last 50
years were also investigated to see if there were any correlations between increases or
decreases of INGO activity and the timing of natural disasters. In Zambia, there have
been 32 natural disasters, the 10th lowest of the 12 countries, and the least amount of
natural disasters of the 3 countries studied here. As there have been less natural disasters
overall, the graphs below show both the number of people that have been affected and
killed over only the last 20 to 30 years.
Figure 37: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in Zambia
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2009

Figure 38: Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters in Zambia
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What could be suggested is that some correlation may be found here. In the early
2000s, the number of people both affected and killed by natural disasters increased
significantly. If we look back at the funding and volunteer numbers of the PC and the
ICRC, those both increased at the same time. It is possible that this is one explanation as
to why there was more INGO activity during this time. Increased INGO activity was
needed as a response to natural disasters that the Zambian government could not control
by themselves. However, this is not necessarily completely conclusive evidence, or the
only reason, as to why Zambia has had more INGO activity than South Africa. Therefore,
we must look further back into their history for possible explanations as to why a
transition country has had some success with INGOs.
Like many other African countries, Zambia was colonized early and experienced
one party rule until recently. Zambia used to be known as the territory of Northern
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Rhodesia and was under the control of the British, beginning in 1891. In 1923 it was
annexed into Northern and Southern Rhodesia until 1953, when Northern and Southern
Rhodesia joined with Nyasaland (what is now known as Malawi) (U.S. State Department
Zambia Country Profile, 2010). After two years of transition, in 1964, Zambia claimed its
independence, along with claiming its new name (CIA World Factbook, 2010).
From 1964 until 1991, Zambia was under the rule of one party, the United
National Independence Party, with the political figure Kenneth Kaunda as its leader.
Kaunda did admittedly bridge many people together with the help of his party, but his
rule was also known to be extremely repressive and corrupt, evident by the fact that in
1972, one party rule was firmly established and all other political parties were banned.
While Zambia struggled with high levels of corruption and repression internally, Zambia
was also supporting the anti-white rule movements of some of its neighboring countries,
support which made it rather unpopular. Conflicts with neighbors caused Zambia to have
to close its borders temporarily. This caused Zambia to be very self dependent, with some
aid from China and other foreign investors. Issues such as refugees, civil wars in other
countries, railroad and transport problems, and unhappy former Portuguese colonies all
increased pressure on the Zambian government (U.S. State Department Zambia Country
Profile, 2010).
It wasn’t until 1990 that opposition began to stir in protest (BBC Zambia Country
Profile, 2010). In 1991 Zambia held its first multiparty elections but the same party held
power and in 1996, there was blatant harassment of any opposition parties (CIA World
Factbook, 2010). In addition, since independence, there have been various problems
within the government, as many are not government trained and much of the direction of
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their economy (as well as other areas) depends on foreign expertise (US State
Department Zambia Profile, 2010). In 2001 and 2006 there were multiparty elections, but
throughout both were charges of corruption and rigging of elections, issues that are still
being dealt with today. Worthy to note here and specific to this investigation is in 1999,
the government drafted a policy that would closely regulate INGOs and INGO activity.
Therefore, the state continues to dominant all aspects, as it has for 50 years, through
power plays, intimidation, and harassment (Freedom House Zambia Country Profile,
2010).
Similar to Tanzania, as Zambia was trying to protect itself from the problems of
its neighbors and join the people of various countries (joining together both Rhodesia’s
and Malawi), much effort was focused on building a national identity, with a focus on a
“humanism” approach. Contrary to Tanzania however, some good economic policies
were implemented and the economic liberalization and privatization that Zambia pursued,
as well as their main export, copper, did attract foreign investment. However, despite
Zambia receiving a substantial amount of foreign aid and assistance, internal factors such
as corruption, debt, and lack of trained government officials has and continues to hamper
true economic development and growth. While recently the economy has stabilized and
there has been an increase in GDP, a decrease in interest rates, and an increase in trade,
unemployment is rampant, high inflation is common, the currency is volatile, and over
2/3 of the population live in poverty (U.S. State Department Zambia Country Profile,
2010).
In terms of government, currently, Zambia is represented by 9 provinces, the same
person occupies the positions of chief of state and head of government, a cabinet, and
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presidential election by popular vote. Despite some democratic progress and political
strides, Zambia is held back from further growth by some of the following factors: a
ranking of 7th in the world for adult infection of HIV/AIDS; problems with boundary
issues, refugees, trafficking, drugs; sparse population; little natural resources; extreme
poverty; and many different religious groups (although ethnically, 99.5% are African)
(CIA World Factbook, 2010). It would seem that Zambia is doing marginally better but
much still needs to be done.
Therefore, when looking at Zambia as an individual country, a few things can be
discussed. First, in comparison with other countries, Zambia has seen relative political
stability over the last 50 years. With one party rule, governance did not vary greatly, like
the Sudan has witnessed. Additionally, while living under one party rule, there were no
major civil wars or internal strife. Rather, Zambia has acted as a mediator with other
countries and much time has been spent on creating a national identity for Zambians.
While the government remains corrupt and repressive, foreign aid is still desired and
received, even if there are problems of distribution. This could be one explanation why
Zambia has seen greater INGO activity than South Africa. Zambia has simply been more
willing to allow for foreign intervention, as the state does not feel threatened by outside
assistance, as it has a tight grip on its country.
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SUDAN
Table 5: Descriptive Variables for Sudan
Five Variables

Result

Natural Disasters

Since 1980, 68 events;
160,468 killed; 28,897,157
affected; storm 1; wildfire 1;
earthquake 2; insect
infestation 5; drought 7; flood
23; epidemic 29

Historical Conflict

Huge history of conflict; war;
Darfur situation

Regime Stability

Instability

Natural Resources

Many natural resources; most
significant is oil

Regime Type Currently

-4 on Polity IV Scale

Sudan is the country representing the interruption category. The countries in the
interruption category are those that have seen numerous fluctuations on the polity IV
scale, vacillating all over the scale, experiencing both autocratic and democratic rule, as
well as periods of transition, anarchy, and interregnum. The following years show the
various polity scores Sudan has been given on the polity IV scale over the last 60 years.
The length of time for each individual score is shown in parentheses: 1956-1957: 8 (2
years); 1958-1963: -7 (6 years); 1964: -88 (1 years); 1965-1968: 7 (4 years); 1969-1970:
-88 (2 years); 1971-1984: -7 (14 years); 1985: -88 (1 year);1986-1988: 7 (3 years);
1989-2001: -7 (13 years); 2002-2004: -6 (3 years) and; 2005-2008: -4 (4 years). The
graph shows the polity2 scores in which only true value polity scores are shown.
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Figure 39: Sudan Polity 2 Score
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As this graph shows, of the countries studied, Sudan has seen the greatest amount
of fluctuation on the polity IV scale. Essentially, this implies massive fluctuations in
governance. What this means is that political stability in Sudan has been almost
nonexistent. Regarding the three other countries for the individual country analysis,
Sudan has had the most INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. Specifically, when
looking at INGO presence, these 3 INGOs entered in the following years: (Sudan is 5th
out of the 12 countries for longest INGO presence and the INGOs entered in both times
of democratic and autocratic rule): PC: n/a; ICRC: 1978 (32 years) and; MSF: 1979 (31
years). (The PC has never operated in the Sudan and hence, this could account for why
out of the 12 countries, while receiving the most funding and volunteer numbers, they
don’t have the greatest amount of presence.)
The following graphs represent the individual numbers for Sudan, looking at the
funding and volunteer numbers given by the ICRC and MSF.
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Figure 40: ICRC Funding for Sudan
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Figure 41: MSF Funding for Sudan
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Figure 42: ICRC Volunteers for Sudan
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These graphs show that the funding and volunteers for both the MSF and the
ICRC have not been consistent, but have fluctuated over time. The ICRC funding has
increased, dipped drastically, stagnated, and then increased again. As for ICRC
volunteers, the numbers of volunteers generally increased until 2004 to 2005 and this
matches the spike in funding as well. 2006 begins to see a decrease in both of these
variables for the ICRC. As for the MSF, while there are only a few years of funding
available, the number of volunteers shows a pattern similar to the ICRC, with a lot of
fluctuation at the beginning of this decade. Towards the middle and end of this decade,
both funding and volunteers begin to decline.
Despite the absence of the PC and the obvious and significant fluctuations of
funding and volunteers in Sudan, when compared to the other three countries in the
individual case studies, this interruption country has had the most INGO activity and
presence, with the most amount of funding and volunteers. As mentioned previously, of
the 12 countries, except for the years of INGO presence, interruption countries were the
ones that received the most funding and volunteers.
Regarding natural disasters, Sudan has experienced 68 natural disasters in the last
50 years. Sudan has the 4th highest number of natural disasters of the 12. Again, the
graphs below show the number of Sudanese people both killed and affected during these
natural disasters, to search for any correlation between an increase or decrease with
funding and/or volunteer numbers and the timing of natural disasters.
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Figure 44: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in Sudan
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Figure 45: Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters in Sudan

When looking at the timing of these natural disasters and the number of Sudanese
people killed, when compared with the three variables, there is no correlation with the
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number of people killed. After 1988, while there were natural disasters, the number of
people killed was not a large number. However, the number of people affected spiked in
the early 1980s and early 1990s, dropping in the early 2000s, and then increasing again in
the last few years. It is possible that the slight increase seen in funding and volunteers
during the years of 2003 and 2004 (for the ICRC) matched with the number of people
affected during those years. However, in 2007 there is a large increase in the number of
people affected by natural disasters but both the ICRC and MSF funding and volunteer
numbers dropped during that year. This would not suggest any correlation between these
variables and the timing of natural disasters. Therefore, while the timing of natural
disasters was a worthy variable to investigate, it would appear after looking at all the
individual countries, that there doesn’t seem to be any significant correlations between
these variables and the timing of natural disasters. As such, the historical analysis into
Sudan might provide more answers as to why this country has had the most INGO
activity, funding, and volunteers, despite a great lack of political stability and much
fluctuation in regime type.
Sudan is a country that has been ravaged by several different factors, resulting in
being at war with itself for more than 3/4 of its existence. As such, economic and political
development and growth has been slow, even non existent at times. It is the largest
country in Africa with the most diverse population on the African continent. In the early
1800s, Sudan was made up of several, small independent kingdoms, represented by
various tribes. However, with such a variety of different tribes in one area, there was
great fragmentation within the country, an environment that remains evident today. In the
late 1880s, there was an attempt to join together these tribes under one leader but it was
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short lived as the British entered in 1900 (U.S. State Department Sudan Country Profile,
2010).
Sudan gained independence from the British in 1956 but almost immediately,
once the new government reneged on its promises to the people of the South to create a
federal system and ignored the Islamic character of the state, a mutiny occurred by army
officers. This in turn launched a 17 year civil war and domination by military regimes
that favored governments of an Islamic nature. Conflicts arose out of the northern attempt
to dominate the economic, political, and social spheres of the non-Muslim, non-Arab
southern Sudanese (US State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).
In 1958, one of the commanding generals took power and strengthened the
southerner side. Essentially, the battle was between those who wanted self-determination
and those wishing for a federal state. However, he was overthrown in 1964 when a
civilian government took power. The next five years saw a succession of unsuccessful
governments until 1969 when communist and socialist officers took over. Complicating
the situation in 1969 was that these commanders claimed socialism as the ideal form of
government but in the process, isolated the Muslim population and the North. These
officers then went to the South for support in which they granted autonomy and created a
peace agreement. However, this proved unsuccessful as oil was found in the South and
the North wanted to reap some of the benefits. The first civil war ended in 1971 but as
these officers abolished the southern regime and took control as one central government,
the peace agreement between the two halves of the country was erased and the South was
put under the control of the North (U.S. State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).
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This move was protested in 1983 when a second civil war broke out which
resulted in more than 4 million displaced and over 2 million dead in two decades. Finally,
in 1986, the socialist government was overthrown and a civilian government was put in
place. In 1989, more change occurred when the National Islamic Front took over, a
military government that practiced political repression and focused on Islam. They were
sanctioned in 1996 for supporting terrorist groups and it wasn’t until the late 1990s that
there began to be movements towards peace. This occurred because of the increased
alienation by the government and due to this, even rebel groups joined together with the
South to fight the current government. (US State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).
In 2002, efforts truly began to end the civil war with a massive peace agreement
between the North and the South. It was decided that the South could have self
determination and peace talks ensued. In 2005, the southern rebels were granted
autonomy for the next six years and since then, there has been power and wealth sharing
between the central government and the southern government (CIA World Factbook,
2010). Currently, the central government is a power share between the National Congress
Party (NCP) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
What might not be evident from this brief summary is that a large majority of the
issues that have been present in Sudan since its beginning have been due to two factors.
First, the variety of different groups of people that have lived in this country has been
great. Since the early 1800s, cleavages between different tribes has been evident and
cultural division has been wide. Second, there are deep religious cleavages, especially
between the Islamic and non-Islamic communities. These cleavages, some which have
been exacerbated by the government, have not only instigated civil war, insurgency,
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rebellion, and much internal strife, but have created obstacles for true economic and
social growth and development.
All of these factors present a complicated situation for Sudan. Due to cultural and
religious cleavages, great political instability, two civil wars, rebel fighting, refugees,
displacement, and the Darfur situation, Sudan has had little time to progress politically,
socially, or economically. Currently, there is supposedly equal power and wealth sharing
between the government of National Unity (North) and the Interim government of
Southern Sudan, with a completely new constitution. There are 25 states, a chief of state
and head of government that are the same, a cabinet, elections, and a bicameral national
legislature (CIA World Factbook, 2010).
Economically, Sudan has a very limited infrastructure upon which to build. While
there was a 6.4% increase in their GDP after the peace agreement, Sudan suffers from 21
billion dollars in debt and there is nothing that can be quickly done to change the damage
of so many years of civil war. Sudan relies heavily on its agriculture but with the oil
found recently in the South, oil has become major export for them, and an international
focus (U.S. State Department Sudan Country Profile, 2010). The discovery of oil has also
caused tension to rise between the North and the South, as the infrastructure and banking
for the oil industry is in the North while the oil is in the South (Freedom House Sudan
Country Profile, 2010). T
However, one of the most contentious issues that Sudan is currently facing is the
separate conflict in Darfur, which is currently known as a complex emergency. In 2003,
there was a reported 2 million people displaced and between 200,000 to 400,000 deaths.
While the UN did intervene, conflict and chaos reign, despite the most recent peace
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agreement of 2010 between the government and rebels. Due to the rocky past of Sudan
and the situation in Darfur, there are many humanitarian problems as well, regarding
displaced people, violence, famine, disease, lack of basic infrastructure, and poverty.
Additionally, the ethnic and rebel fighting has spilled over into neighboring countries
(currently 52% of Sudanese are Black, 39% are Arab, 6% are Beja, 2% are Foreigners,
and 1% other). Sudan is also one of the world’s most corrupt countries and most
freedoms (religion, press, academic, assembly, etc) are severely limited (Freedom House
Sudan Country Profile, 2010). Moreover, even with these significant humanitarian issues,
the government of Sudan has expelled 13 international humanitarian organizations and
has shut down three national aid organizations (US State Department Sudan Profile,
2010).
As can be seen by the historical analyses of the different countries, there are some
similarities but there are also great differences. Some countries have experienced only
one party rule for decades, while others have known nothing but turnovers and challenges
to power. Others have dealt with major humanitarian crises issues such as genocide or
multiple civil wars, while others have lived in relative stability. The reason for this
analysis is to highlight that each country has arrived at the current moment with very
different histories and contexts. These contexts show varying types of environments in
which INGOs can either work successfully or not, and that demands and needs may be
vastly different.
What, then, can be taken away from this individual case analysis? Sudan has
known the most internal struggle and political instability out of these countries and has
had the most INGO presence, with the greatest amount of funding and volunteer
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numbers. What this might suggest is that other factors play a role in INGO activity. The
initial hypothesis of this paper believed that regime type was affecting INGO presence, or
possibly vice versa. What this data suggests is that regime type might not be the only
factor that needs to be considered. Rather, political instability and internal factors, as well
as political motivation for accepting or declining foreign aid need to be closely
investigated. As shown here, South Africa as a democratic country, has had the least
amount of INGO activity, despite the fact that is usually assumed that democracies will
be the most stable regime type and the most amenable to INGO activity. Autocracies,
transition, and interruption countries all have had more INGO activity, with greater
numbers for funding and volunteers. This is contrary to the hypothesis of this thesis
which believes that democracies should have more INGO activity. The next section
discusses the factors of these countries that could affect INGO activity, including three
possible alternative explanations that could explain these findings.
CHAPTER SIX:
Alternative Explanations and Conclusion
When trying to understand what might affect INGO presence, funding, and
volunteer numbers in these 4 countries, multiple factors have to be considered. What can
be clearly stated is that the original research question of this thesis has become much
bigger than anticipated. It cannot be decisively stated if there is one regime type best able
to foster a good relationship with a humanitarian INGO. Regime type is simply one of
many factors that has to be included in this type of investigation. Additionally, while
regime type may influence INGO presence and activity, the reverse can be true as well,
with INGOs influencing regimes.
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Simply put, this question has evolved over the course of this investigation,
becoming more involved than just a question regarding regime type. As can be seen, this
question remains mostly unanswered, with nothing decisive being stated by the scholars
in this field and no, one, explanatory theory. In addition, when using the variables in this
thesis, to act as a proxy for measuring the relationship between regime type and INGO,
there are no clear patterns or correlations that can be seen. Due to the lack of patterns or
correlations between regime types and variables, I had to look more deeply into the
domestic political environments, internal characteristics, economic and social situations,
and natural disasters of specific countries. As nothing can be firmly stated from the data
presented by the 3 INGOs discussed here (and as much data was not publicly available),
more needed to be done.
As such, other avenues had to be investigated, to see if there were other variables
or factors that could explain why there may be more or less INGO activity in a country.
Therefore, the purpose of individual country case studies was an attempt to see if those
factors listed above could provide possible explanations as to why some countries have
seen greater INGO activity and others less. As the case studies show, the original
assumption of this thesis is incorrect, democracies have not had a greater amount of
INGO presence, nor are their relationships with INGOs necessarily better. Therefore, by
using the variables found within each country (internal characteristics, domestic political
environment, civil society, etc), I also suggest three alternative explanations to possibly
explain INGO activity. The quest is to see if one can best explain INGO activity and be
applied successfully to all the countries discussed here.
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The first alternative explanation looks at political stability. As regime type might
not be the deciding factor in determining the amount of INGO activity and the type of
relationship present, political stability could have a larger affect. Political stability doesn’t
necessarily imply that a regime type is democratic, or pursuing liberal, progressive, or
fair policies. Political stability could mean that one regime type has ruled for a long
period of time, with very few fluctuations according to the polity IV scale. Less
fluctuations in governance could provide more stability (or possibly gridlock) in general,
a stability that could spill over into the general populace of a country. However, two sides
have to be accounted for. Stability could mean an incredibly harsh and repressive rule in
which no civil space is allowed for differing opinions. Stability could also mean space
has been created in which there is room for growth, differing opinions, and progress.
Affecting political stability are factors that have been mentioned previously.
Natural disasters, civil wars, internal strife, refugees, corruption, displacement, lack of
natural resources, disease, ethnic and religious cleavages, etc are all factors that could
affect political stability. With this, perhaps INGO activity is determined by the level of
political stability in a country. Is there more or less INGO presence in countries with
more or less political stability? Or, can INGOs operate in any environment, regardless of
political stability?
If we parallel the idea that there should be a greater amount of INGO activity in
democracies, it would seem that there should be more INGO activity in those countries
that are more politically stable. (However, it should be noted that after the data has shown
that there is less INGO presence in democracies, the opposite could be true. As
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humanitarian organizations, these INGOs go to countries that have the most need for aid
and assistance. Therefore, countries with complicating factors and more political
instability could have more INGO activity.)
When applying this explanation to the 4 countries studied here, once applied, the
findings seem both able and unable to support this idea. South Africa and Tanzania have
arguably, despite internal issues (especially in South Africa), had the most political
stability, according to the polity IV scale. Both have firmly stayed as either democratic or
autocratic for long periods of time. Tanzania has had the second highest amount of INGO
presence, funding given, and volunteers sent. In addition, Tanzania has known relative
political stability due to the efforts by Nyerere and his focus on social practices.
Therefore, this country would support this as it has had high levels of political stability,
less internal issues than other countries, and high INGO presence.
South Africa however, seems to both not support and support this explanation.
This country has had the least amount of presence, funding, and volunteers, when
compared to the other countries, but at least superficially, according to the polity IV scale,
has had some political stability. Therefore, with more political stability, there has been
less INGO presence. However, the opposite could be true. There are several problems
with this analysis of South Africa. While South Africa has remained firmly democratic
for years, which does suggest political stability from a superficial standpoint, it has also
known constant unrest and internal strife because of apartheid. This suggests that even
though they have been labeled as democratic, they still have had many civil and social
problems, creating political instability. Therefore, South Africa does provide support for
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this alternative idea, as they could also have had less political stability and less INGO
presence.
However, Zambia and Sudan also disprove this. Zambia, while representing the
transition category of governance, has appeared relatively stable politically. It spent long
years under one autocratic rule, a few years in transition, and has now been under a
democratic rule for numerous years. Again, while these rules might have been repressive,
they were under one party, decreasing political fluctuations and changes and increasing
some semblance of stability. Interestingly, economic policies have been, and are, of high
priority and because of this, Zambia has received much foreign aid and assistance.
However, despite the relative political stability in Zambia and foreign assistance, they are
still second to last (when compared to the other three countries) for INGO presence and
funding, and last for volunteers. This would appear incompatible as one should expect to
see greater levels of INGO activity with more political stability.
Sudan also disproves this. Sudan has suffered the most political instability of the 4
countries and has had the most INGO activity. Sudan has known nothing but change and
upheaval of governance, serious internal issues, and poor foreign relations, but
nonetheless, has had the most INGO activity. Therefore, while two countries somewhat
support this alternative explanation, two countries strongly disprove this. As such, I don’t
believe this explanation can be successfully applied to all of the countries as an
explanation for INGO activity.
The second and third explanations approach from a different perspective.
Throughout this thesis investigation, I have been guilty of looking at INGO activity and
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presence from a liberal, Western bias. I have assumed that humanitarian foreign aid is
typically wanted and something about the regime type or internal characteristics create an
atmosphere that is either conducive, or not, to fostering a good relationship. However, the
opposite perspective needs to be considered, the perspective of the state. The state might
not desire humanitarian foreign assistance for multiple reasons. The state is constantly
asking why they should let outside influence and intervention enter their country. While
INGOs might ask why they should invest in one country or the possible risks of making
such an investment, states ask why they should let foreign aid in. Moreover, how a state
cares for its people can also determine if aid is allowed in or not. Therefore, explanation
two and three approach these issues from the perspective of the state.
The second alternative explanation looks at the relationships with possible patron
states to these countries. Perhaps one of the reasons there is more or less INGO activity is
due to relationships with other, more wealthy, countries. For example, perhaps Zambia
and South Africa (the two countries with the least amount of INGO activity) have
declined foreign aid or refused access because they don’t need outside intervention and
influence (what is most likely Western aid) because they have a patron state who is
helping them. Sudan and Tanzania, with more INGO activity, might be lacking in a
patron state, a state which can help them financially and offer resources. Even though this
does hold some merit, it does not work for these countries either.
South Africa, despite apartheid, has never really known a patron state. In addition
to having a wealth of natural resources, has also acted as a regional and international
leader for a number of years. There is no reason they should have refused foreign aid
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because they were receiving assistance from another state. Tanzania also refutes this.
Tanzania has known multiple benefactors, but these have come in the form of the World
Bank, the IMF, and other Western countries. No one country has acted as a patron.
Additionally, Tanzania has acted as a mediator for the region and could be seen, if not
through money and resources but other means, as a patron state for others in the
region.
Moreover, Zambia and Sudan also refute this second possibility. While Zambia
did receive some assistance from China in the 1960s and 1970s, when their borders were
closed temporarily because of neighboring issues, Zambia has not had any real patron
state to assist them. Zambia is second lowest, in front of South Africa, for INGO activity
but has had no patron state to assist. Sudan on the other hand, has received a lot of aid
from China, as Chinese interests in the state are high, but Sudan has also had the most
INGO activity. Therefore, despite having something of a patron state in the form of
China, Sudan still has the greatest amount of INGO activity. As such, this cannot be
applied successfully to these countries.
The final alternative explanation stems a little from what was just previously
discussed, but looks directly at why states may or may not desire foreign aid. This stands
upon the idea mentioned earlier, that INGOs ask why they should invest in a certain
country and the possible risks, while states ask why they should allow for foreign
intervention. This essentially looks at state interests, with three possible outcomes. First,
states, from the realist perspective, will look for things that enhance the power of the state
and will benefit them the most. Therefore, most states want to maximize their power and
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reduce dependence on foreign aid, limiting any outside influence. States simply don’t
want to open themselves up to foreign influence and intervention. So, the first possibility
with this third explanation suggests that if a state can provide for its people on its own,
there will be no need for international humanitarian support. In fact, if the state can
provide for its population in a satisfactory manner, the people will support that
government, with no outside assistance needed. If the government is not providing in a
satisfactory manner, the people will ask for something more to be done.
The second outcome is that the government can’t support its people or provide
satisfactory aid, and will allow for foreign intervention, opening itself up to outside
influence. This suggests two things. First, this is a government that cares for its people,
by risking losing a small portion of its own power by allowing in outsiders. Second, by
allowing for aid to enter, this looks good for the government and could muster up more
support for the current regime in power. This enhances legitimacy for the state. So while
aid is allowed, it may be for reasons to benefit the population or for reasons that actually
benefit the state. Whatever reason behind the motivation, aid and foreign assistance are
allowed.
The third outcome is the most realist choice and suggests that the state simply
doesn’t need or want aid. Admittedly, the country might desperately need aid but the state
won’t allow for it to enter. This type of regime is one that cares little for its people and
doesn’t wish to gain favor or legitimacy, at home or abroad. As they repel the idea of
outside influence, they don’t need the support of their people to stay in power and don’t
wish to lose any power by opening themselves up to outside influence. This is especially
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true when considering organizations such as MSF, the humanitarian organization that
prides itself on being a watchdog, reporting atrocities and crimes committed by the
government. If a state doesn’t need the support of its citizens to maintain its power, if
they don’t care about their people, why would they allow outside aid that could possibly
threaten their control?
Outside of the African region, an example that could be used for this third
outcome would be Burma. From one perspective, Burma is perhaps one of the most
politically stable countries in the world, ruled by an extremely repressive and harsh
military junta. While a historical analysis of this country isn’t needed here, a single
example can support this third outcome for this final idea. In 2008, Burma was struck by
Cyclone Nargis, killing and affecting thousands of people. While many regions of Burma
were declared as disaster areas and thousands of people were displaced, the military junta
refused international aid for multiple days. Despite international pressure and possible
sanctions, Burma still refused. The military stated that it needed no outside help and
General Thein said, “... his country, with 60 million people has a government, its people
and the private sector to tackle the problem by themselves.” (BBC News “Cyclone
Nargis”, 2008). While the military did eventually allow for aid to enter, it was delayed for
a long time upon entry, there were massive problems with distribution and aid
successfully reaching the Burmese people.
The regime in Burma, essentially, didn’t need its people to maintain its power and
as such, possibly felt it didn’t need to provide aid, or allow aid to enter. Moreover, the
Burmese regime has close political and economic ties with China and if resources were
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needed, the Chinese could help. Otherwise, the military would not want to open up
Burma to outside influence. When applying this alternative explanation to the 4 African
countries, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, when looking at South Africa, this idea
could be applied. As South Africa is rich in resources and acting as a regional leader,
there hasn’t been much need for outside aid. Even more important is that during
apartheid, it is highly possible that the leaders did not want any outside intervention, for
fear of sanctions, international condemnation, and loss of power. The political risks were
too costly for South Africa to welcome foreign assistance. The people in power during
apartheid were satisfied with their rule and by not caring for the condition of their people,
had no desire to open South Africa to outside influence. The regime felt it had enough
control and did not require any kind of foreign assistance.
As for Zambia, they did receive foreign aid, but in areas of economics and
development, not in the humanitarian sphere. However, Zambia has been relatively stable
and has had less internal issues than South Africa. Interestingly, problems did manifest
with the foreign aid to Zambia (economically and developmentally) due to government
corruption and repression. So while Zambia did receive aid, they did not ask for
humanitarian assistance, but they also had less need for it.
As for Tanzania and Sudan, they too provide support for this third explanation.
Tanzania has received a lot of foreign assistance, but this country has been relatively
stable, with a direct focus on developing civil society. Tanzania appears to be a country
that supports the idea that if a government can’t provide for its people, they will be
willing to lose some control and open themselves up to possible outside influence. As
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there has been a lot of INGO activity in Tanzania, this is a likely possibility. While
Tanzania has known relative stability, it has not been without issues and therefore, it is
possible that the Tanzanian government wanted to care for its people in certain moments
when it was unable to do so on its own.
Finally, the situation in Sudan also supports this. Sudan, as mentioned previously,
has known no political stability and has suffered for decades from internal strife and civil
war. Governance has oscillated significantly for the last 60 years and it simply appears
that all regimes have been unable to provide aid. Since Sudan is host to such a prolonged
hostile environment, and considering the Darfur situation, Sudan might simply accept aid
because the need is so great. Recent regimes, including the current one, may have
recognized that there would be no possibility for true growth and development if the
situation remained the same within the country. Instead, for progress to be made and for
some semblance of stability to enter Sudan, the government may have acknowledged that
outside intervention was simply necessary for basic survival. While allowing for aid
might not have been their first option, the Sudanese government had to allow for it, as
they could not maintain any type of control without massive opposition, nor could they
provide for their people. The government might also want to remain in control, a
possibility that is more likely if they are seen to be helping their people. Thus, the
Sudanese situation provides support for this idea.
Therefore, with some exceptions, the alternative explanation looking specifically
at reasons why countries might or might not allow for aid to enter, appears to be
applicable to all of the country case studies investigated here. Again, while not perfect,
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this does offer a possible explanation as to why there might be more or less INGO
presence in certain countries. As stated previously, the question investigating the
relationship between regime type and humanitarian INGOs has evolved through the
course of this thesis into something much bigger. The initial question, hypotheses, and
analysis of data conducted earlier simply proved to be inconclusive. This inconclusive
result does not negate the importance of this question, but it required another approach.
This approach looked at 4 countries, each one representing each category of regime type.
An historical analysis was conducted, to look at specific factors within each country that
could suggest why there might be more or less INGO presence. These factors were then
used in three different alternative explanations, to see if one could best explain INGO
presence. The results of this secondary inquiry show that instead of regime type, the
interests of states needs to be considered regarding the entry of aid.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, several things can be discussed regarding this analysis. The main
objective of this investigation was to discover if a certain regime type fosters the best
relationship with an international humanitarian organization. Is one type of regime more
receptive towards an INGO, giving the latitude to do its work? Is it true that democracies
are always going to be the best to work with these organizations? Is it correct to make this
assumption? Questions that were complementary to the main research question were if it
is possible to see an historical trend of certain regime types that have asked for help? On
the other hand, are there certain regime types that have not asked for help, for whatever
reason? Have there been moments when regime types have blatantly refused help when
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offered? All these questions prove important as little is said on this subject, especially
when focusing on humanitarian international non-governmental organizations. While
there is much in the literature that discusses political and developmental INGOs, the
material is quite limited that covers humanitarian INGOs and no firm consensus has been
reached.
These questions also prove important because with much indecision, the
automatic response appears to be that democracies are simply better. It is assumed that
democracies are the regime types best able to foster the best relationship possible.
Empirical investigation appears lacking however, as it is taken for granted that
democracies will work better with these INGOs. If nothing else, this thesis suggests that
perhaps this shouldn’t be the case. Rather, it is necessary that every time, an empirical
investigation should be conducted, as it isn’t always certain, that democracies are the best
regime type to work with INGOs. This should not be considered a foregone conclusion.
As stated earlier, the initial belief of this thesis agreed with the majority, that
democracies will be the most accommodating to INGOs, I assumed what many do. I
expected that greater levels of democracy will be associated with greater levels of civil
society and greater INGO presence. I expected to see a positive relationship between
these variables. Therefore, I anticipated that democracies would have the longest history
of INGO presence, the greatest amount of funding and number of volunteers. However,
after the literature review and other possibilities that have added layers of complexity to
this question, and due to the compelling evidence posited by Mercer, I wanted one other
hypothesis to be tested. Hypothesis two states that there will be a negative relationship
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between variables and that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO
presence. Moreover, this could either be due to the level of democracy of a regime type
being the independent variable and affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be
the dependent variable, being affected by INGO presence. Also affecting the outcome of
these hypotheses are a multitude of other factors, including domestic political
environment and civil society. In addition, could these hypotheses determine if
democracies really are the best regime type to work with INGOs.
Therefore, many variables were measured and a multitude of factors were
considered to answer these questions and to test my hypotheses in measuring this
relationship. This thesis looked at the various regime types of 12 Sub-Saharan African
countries, according to the Polity IV scale, while measuring the relationship between
regimes and INGOs. The three variables used were chosen as they were considered to be
a good representation, or proxy, for the relationship between regime type and INGO. The
data represented by the three variables was collected and an aggregated perspective for
all 12 countries was shown by four different categorizations of regime types. In addition,
4 specific countries were chosen to show a more singular representation of the
relationship being measured by these three variables, highlighted by individual case
studies.
Interestingly, when considering the three variables, the years of INGO presence,
funding, and volunteer numbers, the results prove interesting. Contrary to the
overwhelming belief that democracies are the regime types best able to foster a good
relationship, the results of this thesis at least suggest that this might not always be the
case. Moreover, when considering the five different variables discussed in chapter 4, a
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few conclusions can be drawn. First, there appears to be no observable historical pattern
of regime types asking or refusing aid from a humanitarian INGO. Second, after
investigating the timing of historical conflict, natural, and man made disasters, no
patterns were seen regarding an increase or decrease of presence, funding, or volunteer
numbers. When specifically looking at the top ten natural and man made disasters in the
last fifty years for each country (according to the number of people both disturbed/
displaced and killed), there were no obvious increases or decreases in any of the variables
for any of the countries or INGOs. The same is true when considering a country’s natural
resources and any political, ideological, and religious objections that might have arisen.
When considering the first variable for the data that was aggregated, transition
regimes were those that had the longest INGO presence, followed closely by interruption
and autocracy regimes, and then finally democratic regimes. When looking at the total
amount of funding, interruption regimes have received the most funding, followed by
autocracies, transitions, and finally democracies. Similarly, total number of volunteers
have been highest in interruption regimes, followed by transition regimes, democracies,
and finally autocracies. Not only does this data show that there isn’t a consistent regime
type that has had the longest presence of INGOs, or the highest amount of funding and
volunteer numbers, this data shows that democratic regime types tend to be the lowest in
numbers when using these variables. Overall, transition and interruption regimes have the
greatest number of years of INGO presence, amount of funding, and volunteer numbers.
The question follows, why might this be the case? Why do transition,
interruption, and autocratic regimes have greater numbers regarding INGO years of
presence, total funding, and volunteer numbers? Why are democracies the only regime
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types that have not restricted access in any manner? What, essentially, is the demand?
What are the reasons or factors that demand INGO presence? What is pulling these
INGOs in? Is it that non-democratic regimes have a higher demand for humanitarian
INGOs and democratic regimes less so? Once INGOs are in democratic regimes, are they
in an environment that is more conducive for them to stay, never asked to leave?
These questions allow one to wonder what factors might play a significant role in
creating a demand for INGO presence. What factors impact the type of relationship that
could be created between regime types and humanitarian organizations? One has to
consider a plethora of possible different factors that could affect the demand by different
regimes, thereby affecting the relationship between them and humanitarian INGOs.
Harking back to the argument posited by Julie Fisher, it seems that certain political
climates, situations, and circumstances do play an important role. It appears that most
countries and regimes are willing to foster a good relationship with an INGO but the
degree of how good that relationship will be depends on the various political
atmospheres, internal dynamics, and characteristics of the country.
Some other factors to consider, and that have been mentioned previously are:
political context; political realignment; development and economic problems; foreign
policy; history of relationship with INGOs; industry type; degree of industrialization;
resources; domestic politics; ability/willingness to work with outside groups; political
institutions; ability to make credible commitments; level of modernization and/or
dependency; general inability of the state to control domestic situations (e.g.: adverse
humanitarian conflicts such as civil war, genocide, natural disaster, human rights abuses,
political, religious, ethnic cleavages, etc); disease; lack of any real medical infrastructure
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or assistance programs/plans; and lack of resources/personnel to deal with famine,
disease, overpopulation, drought, etc.
Another factor of importance addresses issues of access, this includes considering
some of the following: if the regime allowed access by an INGO; if the regime asked an
INGO to leave; if serious problems manifested between the regime and INGO or; if
obstacles were created by the regime or INGO. While there might be instances that were
not discovered, the following are the specific instances that were found during the
process of this investigation that highlighted problems between a regime type and an
INGO. The instances in which access was denied, refused, or compromised is as follows:
Lesotho 1998: the government thought of boycotting the Peace Corps due to accusations
of spying. However, nothing manifested (Peace Corps, 2010); Malawi 1907s: the Peace
Corps was asked to leave briefly for supposedly not conforming to government
regulations. However, it is unknown which regulations they were not in compliance with
(U.S. State Department Malawi Profile, 2010); Niger 1996: While these 3 INGOs were
not asked to leave, other aid organizations were asked to leave during a military coup, but
the situation remained tenuous (U.S. State Department Niger Profile, 2010); DRC 2004,
2006: the MSF left multiple times due to outbreaks of violence and disease (MSF
Activity Report 2004, 2006); Sudan 2008, 2009: there were multiple instances in which
INGOs were denied access or asked to leave; expulsion (briefly) of MSF, as well as
several abductions of both MSF and ICRC staff, which threatened the activity and
presence of both INGOs (MSF Activity Report 2008, 2009) (ICRC, 2010).
Overall, it can be stated that more attention needs to be given to the demand
factors that may be present in a specific country. Why does a country need INGO
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presence? In addition, issues of access also play an important role. Have there been and
are there any issues of access? Have INGOs been denied entry or faced obstacles,
limiting the ability to do their work? In this thesis, I controlled for various factors the best
I could, but more needs to be done for a firmer grasp on control variables. Demand
factors and issues of access are two, overarching, variables that must be taken into serious
consideration when asking these sorts of questions.
Consequently, what can be taken away from this investigation? Overall, the initial
results appear inconclusive. There doesn’t appear to be one specific regime type, using
this method of measurement, that consistently fosters the best relationship possible.
Regime fluctuation is too varied and there are too many additional factors to consider,
factors that could affect the demand and need for these INGOs. Therefore, nothing truly
conclusive can be stated. As such, three alternative explanations were presented after the
4 case studies, to try and explain further why there might be more or less INGO activity
in a country with a certain regime type. Of the three, the one that seemed to work the best
looked at state interests, and why a state would or would not allow foreign aid.
Essentially, INGO activity in a country can be traced to the desire and power of the state,
to either exercise total control, or be willingness to open up to outside intervention and
influence. Those states wishing to remain in complete control and with little regard to
their population, had less INGO activity overall. The states that were relatively secure
and wished to help their people (for altruistic reasons or otherwise), allowed for foreign
intervention, resulting in greater INGO activity.
Additionally, if nothing else, this investigation shows that democracies shouldn’t
be the default assumption, as they seem to have the least amount of interaction with
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humanitarian INGOs and thus, fewer relationships overall. Democracies, simply by
having less need for INGOs and fewer interactions with these organizations, might not
foster the best relationship possible, as they might not be fostering any kind of
relationship. Regime types such as autocracies, transitions, and interruptions are the
regimes that are in need of these organizations and must form relationships with them. It
is these regimes that we must look more closely at, to determine what creates the best
relationship possible and what other factors need to be considered.
This investigation and analysis has its limitations, but there are ways in which
future avenues of study could be improved upon. First, there is an obvious lack of data, as
much of the date concerning the INGOs was not available or accessible. More time could
be spent on trying to access INGO records that are not available to the public, or different
variables could be used as proxies to measure the relationship. Also, the labeling and
scoring scale of the Polity IV database might be too detailed in showing regime
fluctuations. Perhaps using a database or categorization method that didn’t include so
many fluctuations might have produced a more conclusive result. Second, only 12
countries were used in this study, a very small sample. In addition, as a region, Africa
only transitioned away from colonization a few decades ago and is still very young, in the
midst of massive transitions, and dealing with many issues. Many African countries also
have similar histories and experiences, despite their differences. A specific weakness is
that there was only one country, South Africa, that was used for the democratic regime
categorization. This study would be further enhanced with a larger sample size and using
more countries within each categorization. Perhaps too, a future study could use this
method of testing but look at different regions of the world, to see if the results are
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similar. Finally, a more in depth analysis could be conducted, to further investigate the
very specific demand and need factors that are unique to each country and can affect the
relationship and presence of INGOs.
In the end, while the variables measuring the relationship did not highlight a
specific regime type, the type of governance and state’s interests remain crucial to our
understanding of what occurs in a country and what might happen when the aid of an
international humanitarian organization is offered and/or received. It must not be
assumed that democracies work the best with these humanitarian organizations. It must
be acknowledged that along with regime type, there are many other variables to consider,
variables that affect the demand and need for INGOs, as well as issues of access. When
investigating this relationship, other variables must be included to gain the fullest and
greatest understanding of what is happening between regimes and humanitarian INGOs.
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Data Appendix
Total Amount of Funding: (all countries)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Data was available for the following years for each country:
* Tanzania: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Rwanda: PC: 1991-1994; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 1994-2008
* South Africa: PC: 1997-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Madagascar: PC: 1994-2008; MSF: 2006-2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Malawi: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Mozambique: PC: 1998-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Kenya: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Zambia: PC: 1994-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Sudan: PC: N/A; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 1994-2008
* DRC: PC: N/A; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Lesotho: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2006-2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Niger: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2004, 2006, 2007; ICRC: 2002-2008
Total of Volunteer Numbers: (all countries)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Data was available for the following years for each country:
* Tanzania: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2001-2006; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Rwanda: PC: 1991-1993; MSF: 2001-2007: ICRC: 2001-2008
* South Africa: PC: 1997-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Madagascar: PC: 1994-2008; MSF: 2001-2005; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Malawi: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Mozambique: PC: 1997-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Kenya: PC: 1991-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Zambia: PC: 1994-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
* Sudan: PC: N/A; MSF: 2001-2005; 2006-2008; ICRC: 2001-2008
* Lesotho: PC: 2001-2008; MSF: 2006-2008; ICRC 2002-2008
* DRC: PC: N/A; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2001-2008
* Niger: PC: 2001-2008; MSF: 2001-2008; ICRC: 2002-2008
Total Funding of all INGOs: (South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Funding for MSF is only given for the years of 2004, 2006, and 2007 data for other years
was inaccessible. ICRC funding is given the following years: Tanzania, South Africa, and
Zambia: 2002-2008; Sudan: 1994 - 2008. No funding was given to Sudan by the PC.
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Number of Volunteers from all INGOs: (South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
PC data only available for the following years: Tanzania 1991-2008; South Africa:
1997-2008; Zambia: 1994-2008: Sudan: Not Applicable. MSF data only available for
2001-2008. ICRC data only available for the following years: Sudan: 2001-2008;
Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia: 2002-2008.
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